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JURISDICTION 
The Supreme Court had jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated ("UCA") § 78-2-2(3)0). Under UCA § 78-2-2(4), the Supreme Court has 
transferred the matter to the Court of Appeals, which possesses jurisdiction over matters 
so transferred pursuant to UCA § 78-2a-3(2)0). 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
ISSUES 
I. Whether the Trial Court erred in denying Mr. Howard's two motions for summary 
judgment: 
a. By finding that there were material facts in dispute that precluded 
summary judgment (R. 47-53, 232-36, 306-11, 621-30); 
b. By concluding that res judicata did not bar Plaintiffs' claims (R. 53-
57,240-41); 
c. By concluding that Plaintiffs suffered interference with their water 
right, despite having always received all of the water they are 
entitled to, watering more land than they are entitled to, with more 
water than they are entitled to, at a greater rate than they are entitled 
to (R. 57-58, 311-19); 
d. By concluding, despite Plaintiffs' having suffered no damage, that 
their claims were not moot (R. 246, 319, 631-32). 
II. Whether the Trial Court erred in its Final Judgment and in its Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, upon which the Final Judgment was based, both of 
which were filed on May 12, 2005: 
a. By finding that, historically, Plaintiffs' diversion of water regularly 
employed a pumping and refilling cycle (R. 1280); 
b. By finding that the Marriott slough has a "generally south to north 
4837-7057-6640 H0951 001 / w ; 
flow"(R. 1284); 
c. By ruling that Lee Howard's dike interfered with Plaintiffs' water 
right by affecting the natural flow of the stream, despite Plaintiffs' 
having received sufficient water at their point of diversion to satisfy 
their water right (R. 1287, 1573 at 575-96); 
d. By concluding that the three-acre duty on Plaintiffs' water-right 
certificate had been increased to four acre-feet (R. 1284-85, 1572 at 
211-13); 
e. By concluding that Mr. Howard withdrew his trespass claim (R. 
1275, 1461); 
f. By concluding that there were no grounds for Mr. Howard's 
nuisance claim (R. 1275-77, 1461); and 
g. By concluding that there were no grounds for Mr. Howard's 
negligence claim (R. 1275-77, 1461). 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
As to Issues La, Lb, Lc, & Ld: 
Because summary judgment is granted as a matter of law rather than fact, the 
appellate court is free to reappraise the trial court's legal conclusions, Winegar v. Froerer 
Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 107 (Utah 1991), for correctness, without deference to the trial 
court, Country Oaks Condominium Management Comm. v. Jones, 851 P.2d 640, 641 
(Utah 1993). This nondeferential standard also applies to the threshold issue of whether 
material issues of fact exist making summary judgment improper. Neiderhauser Builders 
& Dev. Corp. v. Campbell 824 P.2d 1193, 1196 (Utah Ct. App.1992). 
As to Issues II.a, ILb: 
"A party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that 
supports the challenged finding," Utah R. App. Proc. ("URAP"), Rule 24(a)(9), "and then 
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demonstrate that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the finding even when 
viewing it in a light most favorable to the court below." Chen v. Steward, 2004 UT 82, 
f76, 100 P.3d 1177 (citation omitted). 
As to Issues II. d> Il.e, ILf& II.g: 
A trial court's determination of questions of law is given no deference on review 
because the appellate court has "the power and duty to say what the law is and to ensure 
that it is uniform throughout the jurisdiction." A reviewing court thus applies a 
correctness standard, deciding the matter for itself. Drake v. Industrial Commission of 
Utah, 939 P.2d 177 (Utah 1997) (quoting State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994)). 
As to Issue H.c: 
See Section III.A.3, below. 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
(The text of these provisions is fully set forth in the Addendum) 
Utah Code Annotated §§ 73-3-1 73-3-10 73-3-16 
73-3-2 73-3-11 73-3-17 
73-3-3 73-3-12 73-3-20 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from decisions of the Second Judicial District Court, Judge Brent 
West presiding, denying Lee Howard's two motions for partial summary judgment and 
entering final judgment against him following trial. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The trial court heard the Howards' first Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on 
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April 12, 2002, but denied it in a Decision filed on July 9, 2002 (copy attached at 
Addendum {"Add'") Tab F). The Howards' second Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
came before the trial court on October 29, 2003. The trial court denied this second 
Motion in a minute entry that same date (copy attached at Add, Tab G); the actual Order, 
however, was not entered until November 20, 2003, several days after the close of trial (a 
copy of the Order is attached dXAdd. Tab H). Trial was held on November 13, 14, and 17, 
2003, the trial court issuing Decisions on April 27 and August 23, 2004 (copies attached, 
respectively, at Add. Tabs I & L). The Final Judgment {Add. Tab K) and Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law {"FF&CL"; separately "FF" and "CX"; Add. Tab J) were entered 
over the Howards' objections on May 12, 2005. Notice of Appeal was timely filed on 
June 8, 2005. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS1 
Lee Howard2 owns property located in 13 of Township 6 North, Range 3 West, 
Salt Lake Base and Meridian, which is adjacent to property that Plaintiff Edward C. 
England claims to own (R. 2, 13, 65, 156).3 England claims to own property directly 
adjacent to Mr. Howard's, and Glynn Wayment4 claims to own property north of 
1
 The facts set forth in this Statement of Facts are for the most part those before the trial 
court at summary judgment. Facts adduced or elicited at trial, and those explicitly 
appearing in the trial court's Findings of Fact, are cited as footnotes below. 
2
 Lee Howard's son, William Howard, was sued by the Plaintiffs for an alleged trespass 
that the trial court dismissed. (R. 1573 at 330.) He was not a counterclaimant and is, 
therefore, not an appellant in this case. 
3
 Trial: R. 1573 at 396-97; FF^ 15-16 (copy of the FF attached at Add. Tab J). 
4
 When this litigation began, Glynn Wayment owned certain properties adjacent to 
England's. On December 31, 2001, after litigation had already begun, Wayment 
transferred his property to Benchland Investments, Ltd. There was, however, no evidence 
of this until the trial. (R. 1571 at 16-17.) 
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England's property (R. 65, 156).5 Transecting each of these properties is a portion of the 
Little Weber Creek system. The creek runs in part in a northwesterly direction toward 
and eventually into the Great Salt Lake; in other parts, the creek runs southeasterly, 
toward and into the Weber River.7 The creek system is very slow moving and, in the area 
of the parcels of property at issue, the system includes a series of sloughs (see id.)} There 
is and historically has been a slough named the Marriott slough (also referred to herein as 
"the slough") that is located in sections 12 and 13 of Township 6 North, Range 3 West, 
Salt Lake Base and Meridian and portions of the slough are on property owned by 
England and Wayment. (R. 2, 14, 65-66, 156-57).9 At the top of the creek and slough 
system lies an irrigation pond created by Knight Irrigation Company.10 Next comes a 
portion of the creek system called the Knight slough, which lies mostly on Mr. Howard's 
property (R. 65-66).11 Finally, a slough system called the Marriott slough transects the 
property owned by England and Wayment (see id.). Messrs. Wayment and England hold 
a single state-approved water right (No. 35-8073),12 which permits them only to divert 
water at a maximum rate of .5 cubic feet per second (cfs) from the Marriott slough up to a 
total of 75 acre feet of water per year, between May 1st and September 30th, to irrigate 25 
Trial: R. 1571 at 16, 134-35; FF^ 15-16, 17 (Add Tab J). 
7 Trial: R. 1573 at 460-62. 
Trial: R. 1571 at 28-29; FFffif 3 & 20 (Add. Tab J). 
*Id. 
Trial: R. 1571 at 17-18; Trial Exhibit ("Tr.Exh.") 101 (a copy of which is attached 
hereto at Add. Tab C); FF^ 21 (Add. Tab J). 
n Trial: R. 1571 at 18-21; R. 1573 at 397-99. 
12 Trial: R. 1573 at 397-99. 
Tnal:R. 1571atl6& 135. 
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acres of property lying northeast from their point of diversion (R. 48, 172).13 This is the 
only water right Plaintiffs hold (R. 337). 
Water is diverted by Plaintiffs from the slough by way of a pump. (R. 340).14 At 
the Northern end of the Marriott slough lies a dam controlled by Plaintiffs, who have the 
ability to control or even stop the flow of water through the Marriott slough. (R. 338-
39).15 Sometime in 1997, without legal right to do so, Plaintiffs began dredging the 
Marriott slough, diverting water to the slough from a canal running northeast of the 
slough, and then began diverting significantly more water from the slough (R. 341-42).16 
A little after Wayment and England began their dredging, Mr. Howard, who had a 
permit from the Army Corp of Engineers to do so, in 1998 diked a portion of the Knight 
slough on his own property, in which he placed a 36-inch pipe and a 15-inch pipe to 
allow water to pass through the dike (R. 324).17 He created this dike to erect a fence 
along his property line to keep his cattle from getting mired in the slough and crossing 
onto other property.18 The pipes placed in the dike are more than sufficient to permit the 
same historic flow through the slough that had existed theretofore (R. 324 & 351).19 The 
pipes do not create a head or otherwise cause a backup of water (see id. & 3 54-5 8). The 
water level on each side of the dike is the same (R. 324). There has been no additional 
13
 Trial: R. 1571 at 62-65,74-76, 197-203; 1572 at 259-65; R. 78 (copy attached at Add. 
TabB);FF<h\(Add.TabJ). 
14
 Trial: R. 1571 at 22-23; Tr.Exh. 113. 
15
 Trial: R. 1571 at 25-27. 
16
 Trial: R. 1571 at 53-57, 71-72, 83; FF<h 13. 
17
 Trial- R 1571 at 71-72; 1573 at 401-03; Tr.Exh. 5. 
18
 Trial: R. 1573 at 401-03; Tr.Exh. 27. 
19
 Trial: R. 1573 at 401-09; Tr.Exh. 33. 
20
 Trial: R. 1573 at 406-09. 
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ponding on either side of the dike since the installation of the dike (id).21 Nevertheless, 
England and Wayment began protesting Mr. Howard's activities. 
England and Benchland admit that more than 0.5 cfs has been pumped from the 
slough since the placement of Mr. Howard's dike (R. 308 & 345).22 (The pump used by 
England and Benchland (and, prior to Benchland, by Wayment) to divert water from the 
Marriott slough pumps up to 10 cfs of water and has pumped at that rate since at least 
1998 (see id).)23 They admit to having used water pumped or diverted outside of the May 
1st to September 30th time limit (R. 308, 324, 332-33, 345).24 They also admit that they 
have diverted more than 75 acre-feet of water from the slough each year (R. 307, 345).25 
They also admit that they have irrigated more than the 25 acres of land approved for 
irrigation by their water right (R. 308, 346).26 
Plaintiffs admit having always had sufficient water to irrigate their land, except at 
77 
times during the pre-dike period between 1979 and 1997 (R. 347). In fact, since the dike 
has been put in, Plaintiffs admit to having received more water than they have had for 
over 40 years. (See id.) Despite this, Plaintiffs brought a claim against Mr. Howard and 
his son William in June of 2001, asserting (1) that the Howards have interfered with 
England's and Wayment's water rights (R. 5-6), (2) that the Howards should be enjoined 
from future interference with England's and Wayment's water rights (R. 6-7), and (3) 
See id. 
™ Trial: R. 1571 at 59-60; FF\U (Add. Tab J). 
i4See id; FF 111. 
Trial: R. 1571 at 199-200. 
2g Trial: R. 1571 at 65. 
Trial: R. 1571 at 60-68, 195-98; FF \ 12, 41 (Add. Tab J). These admissions are 
admission to crimes. See UCA § 73-3-3(9), 73-2-27(1 )(d) & (2). 
Trial: R. 1571 at 68-71. 
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that the Howards have trespassed on England's and Wayment's property (R. 7). 
Lee Howard answered Plaintiffs' complaints and counterclaimed for negligence, 
private nuisance, and trespass (R. 19-23). With the exception of certain claims for 
trespass against Plaintiffs for personally trespassing on the Howard property, these claims 
derive from Plaintiffs' illegal use of the slough, including illegally damming the slough, 
storing water in the slough without a right to do so, diverting water (since 1997) from the 
Warren Irrigation Canal into the Marriott slough without right to do so, diverting water 
(since 2002) into the slough from the Weber River without a right to do so, and 
wrongfully blocking county drain canals (see id.). 
Before they could store water in the slough, Plaintiffs were required to establish 
the dam as a point of diversion and the point from which the water is taken from the 
stream as a point of rediversion. Plaintiffs' Certificate of Appropriation, however, does 
not list these points of diversion or rediversion (R. 335), and Plaintiffs have never filed a 
Change Application (R. 317). They have, however, been storing water in the slough 
without any right to do so.29 
Plaintiffs have never filed the requisite exchange application to be permitted to 
divert water from the Warren Irrigation Canal to the slough and then to redivert it from 
the slough to irrigate land (R. 315-18).30 Plaintiffs' Warren Irrigation water rights do not 
grant the right to Plaintiffs to irrigate any of the property owned by Plaintiffs (id).31 
z
* Trial: R. 1571 at 77. 
29
 Such activities are criminal. See supra note 26. 
30
 Trial: R. 1571 at 86. 
31
 Trial: R. 1572 at 288. 
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Nonetheless, Plaintiffs have been doing so since 1997 (id.). Similarly, Plaintiffs have 
also been diverting water from the Weber River to the slough and then rediverting it to 
irrigation without ever having filed an exchange application. 
As noted above (see Course of Proceedings, supra), the trial court denied 
Defendants' first Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on July 9, 2002, and their 
second on October 29, 2003 (although the consequent Order was not entered until after 
the close of trial). Trial was held on November 13, 14, and 17, 2003. Final Judgment and 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were entered over the Howards' objections on 
May 12, 2005, and the Howards appealed the matter on June 8, 2005. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Under Utah water law, so long as a water right owner receives sufficient water at 
his point of diversion, in the quantity and of the quality to which his appropriation entitles 
him, he or she has "no control over or concern with what anyone else may do on or with 
the stream, or what uses, if any, they may make thereof." Adams v. Portage Irrigation, 
Reservoir & Power Co., 95 Utah 1, 72 P.2d 648, 653 (Utah 1937); see also College Irr. 
Co. v. Logan River & Blacksmith Fork Irr. Co.} 780 P.2d 1241, 1244 (Utah 1989). 
This is precisely the situation Plaintiffs are in, but from which they have expended 
such remarkable effort and substantial resources to render themselves immune. Plaintiffs' 
water right gives them the right to divert from the Marriott slough in Warren, Utah, 0.5 
cfs from May 1st through September 30th each year, up to a total of 75 acre-feet of water, 
33 Such activities are criminal. See supra note 26. 
Such activities are criminal. See supra note 26. 
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to irrigate a specific 25 acres of property. However, they have admittedly pumped more 
than 0 , cfs from the slough-and a, feast 10 efs since 1998-diverting far more than the 
75 acre-feet permitted by their water right and irrigating far more than their permitted 25 
acres all in violation of Utah law. 
Having thus inarguably always received all of the water to which they are entitied, 
and having in addition illegally seized even more, Piaintiffs shouid not have been able to 
successful attack Lee Howard's placement of a dike upstream on his own property. And 
indeed, Plaintiffs adduced no evidence at ail that Lee Howard's dike interferes with their 
v Tnstead of evidence, Plaintiffs simply repeat their incessant 
water right in any way. Insteaa 
i. ,- u , the rieht—somehow—to control all upstream uses of the slough 
mantra that they have the rigm 
such that they may continue their theft of water, at leisure and with impunity. 
Plaintiffs argue that they "supplement" their water with water from alternative 
,
 A • thPV store water in the Marriott slough for later use. These actions, sources, and that tney siuic 
„t wallv do, since water from one source, introduced into another, however, they cannot legan? « , 
, ,. • -cfcahle from the latter. Therefore, in order to divert, or to redivert it, ceases to be distinguishable irom me 
^A h»ve to file another application for diversion of water with the State 
a water user would nave w " 
TJ • •
 t W k the only way to appropriate water under Utah law. 
Engineer, since that is mc w«; J 
The Howards filed two motions for summary judgment, unsuccessfully. The trial 
- A • t ^ntine the Howards' motions, since Plaintiffs' claims were (1) barred 
court erred in not granting uis * 
v. n«o already been reviewed by the State Engineer, and (2) there were by res judicata, having aireauy uc 
no material facts at issue. 
Although the matter should never have gone beyond summary judgment, it did. At 
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trial the court, in spite of clear Utah law, ruled against Mr. Howard, based upon 
representations that the Plaintiffs certificate of appropriation was somehow subordinate to 
the original appropriator's application, the alleged historic use, and an unauthenticated 
printout of a web page. Based upon these questionable sources, the trial court concluded 
that the Howard dike interfered with the Plaintiffs' "method of appropriation," 
notwithstanding there being no evidence whatsoever that Plaintiffs had ever been 
deprived of even one drop of the water to which they are entitled due to Mr. Howard's 
dike. Indeed, Plaintiffs, and unfortunately Mr. Howard's land, is inundated with more 
water than it was ever contemplated the Plaintiffs or their predecessors would legally use. 
Finally, the trial court improperly dismissed Mr. Howard's counterclaims for 
trespass, nuisance, and negligence, asserting that Mr. Howard had withdrawn his trespass 
counterclaim (which he had not), and that based upon the court's ruling that the Howard 
dike interfered with the Plaintiffs' appropriation, Mr. Howard could not prevail on his 
nuisance or negligence counterclaims based on the flooding of his property by the 
Plaintiffs. 
ARGUMENT 
I. INTRODUCTION. 
Seldom does an appellant come before this Court seeking relief from such a 
congeries of clear and plain errors by a trial courts. Astonished and indeed alarmed by the 
decisions of the trial court—which appear to Mr. Howard to be directly and obviously 
repugnant to the laws of Utah—Mr. Howard turns to this Court in the hope that his right 
to use his own property in a way that does not harm his neighbor may be restored. 
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In complete violation of plain and unambiguous Utah water law, Plaintiffs have 
dredged a slough they had no legal right to dredge, so as to store water they have no legal 
right to store, by constructing a dam they had no legal right to construct, in order to 
irrigate lands they have no legal right to irrigate, with far more water than they have any 
le al right to use. By so doing, they have illegally overfilled the Marriott slough, illegally 
altering (to the point of reversing) the natural flow, illegally saturating Mr. Howard's 
property and transmuting some areas of once-firm pasture land into little more than a 
How And all of this they have done in open defiance of Mr. Howard's property rights, 
the authority of the State Engineer: the restrictions on their water right, which they have 
unblushingly ignored, and an administrative decision they have brazenly circumvented. 
But then Mr. Howard raised across the slough the earthen dike at issue, upon 
which to erect a fence to keep their cattle from straying or sinking belly-deep in slime. 
This dike is pierced by two large pipes and has had, over the years it has stood, no 
demonstrable effect whatsoever upon the flow through the slough. Plaintiffs, however 
(who inexplicably seem to believe theft of water to be legal), indignantly complained that 
that Mr. Howard's dike somehow "interferes" with their (unlawful) water storage and 
overuse and haled him into court. 
And won. 
Lee Howard was—he still is—amazed and dismayed by such an Alice-through-
the-looking-glass ruling. It is, in his mind, as though an assassin were to be awarded 
damages against an innocent bystander for unwittingly walking into the line of fire and 
ruining a perfectly good murder. Based upon an interference wholly fictional, an equally 
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quixotic prescriptive right protecting the means by which Plaintiffs get away with liquid 
larceny, and a set of findings which require conclusions entirely the reverse of those it 
reached, the trial court has gaveled into insensibility more than a century of once-
intelligible water law. 
Utterly confounded, adrift in a sea of water law no longer either predictable or 
protective, Lee Howard comes before this Court for redress. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE GRANTED THE 
HOWARDS' MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
A. Plaintiffs' Claims Fail as a Matter of Law, 
1. Plaintiffs Cannot Show Interference. 
Water law in Utah is crystal clear: "[A]s long as [a water right owner] receives at 
his point of diversion the quantity and quality to which his appropriation entitles him, he 
as an appropriator, has no control over or concern with what anyone else may do on or 
with the stream^ or what uses, if any, they may make thereof." Adams v. Portage 
Irrigation, Reservoir & Power Co., 95 Utah 1, 72 P.2d 648, 653 (Utah 1937) (emphasis 
added). "[S]o long as a water user has sufficient water at its point of diversion to satisfy 
its right, it has no complaint about upstream uses of water. . . ." College Irr. Co. v. Logan 
River & Blacksmith Fork Irr. Co.y 780 P.2d 1241, 1244 (Utah 1989) (citing Adams, 
supra, and Conantv. Deep Creek & Curlew Valley Irr. Co., 23 Utah 627, 631, 66 P. 188, 
190(1901)). 
To prevail on their claims, Plaintiffs had to shoulder the heavy burden of proving 
that Mr. Howard had "substantially interfered] with the quantity or quality of water that 
would otherwise reach" them, Salt Lake City v. Silver Fork Pipeline Corp., 2000 UT 3, 
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[^25, 5 P.3d 1206; that is to say, of course, the quantity or quality of the water to which 
[Plaintiffs] were entitled." Id. ^28, n.10 (emphasis added). But this Plaintiffs did not— 
indeed, could not possibly—do. 
Plaintiffs' water right gives them the right to divert at a rate of 0.5 cfs from May 
1st through September 30th each year, up to an annual total of 75 acre-feet of water to be 
applied on a specific 25 acres of property.34 They admit that they have no other water 
right in the Marriott slough. They also admit that they have pumped more than 0.5 cfs 
from the slough—and at least 10 cfs since 1998—diverting far more than the 75 acre-feet 
permitted by their water right and irrigating far more than their permitted 25 acres. (See 
R. 81-83.)35 
Plaintiffs have thus inarguably always received all of the water to which they are 
entitled, and then some. As a matter of law (as a matter of common sense), one cannot 
receive all of the water to which he or she is entitled, of the quality and in the quantity to 
which he is entitled, illegally seize more water than that to which he or she is entitled, 
unlawfully store the water (a right to which he is not entitled), and still rationally 
maintain that he is not receiving his entitlement. In short, you cannot use more and claim 
to have less at the same time. 
Quite aside from the inescapable mathematics, however, Plaintiffs adduced no 
34
 We shall discuss later Plaintiffs' unilateral and illegal expansion of their right to 100 
acre-feet. In any event, they have taken far more water from the Marriott slough even 
than this. Further, it bears noting that the Plaintiffs do not own all 25 acres of the 
appurtenant land and, therefore, cannot properly claim entitlement to water for all 25 
acres; they can legitimately claim only 18.83 acres. (See R. 761-62; R. 1571 at 75-77, 
134-35, 197-98; R. 1573 at 395-96; Tr. Exhs. 50-65.) 
Plaintiffs' admissions, in addition, make it clear that Plaintiffs are in fact guilty of a 
criminal offense. See UCA §§ 73-3-3(9), 73-2-27(l)(d) & (2). 
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evidence at all that Mr. Howard's dike interferes with their water right—a rather critical 
prerequisite to prevailing on an interference claim. In fact, besides the admissions 
referenced above, there is no evidence of the flow at Plaintiffs' historic point of diversion 
(see R. 84); nor is there any evidence of the flow rates of any of the pumps used to divert 
water from the Marriott slough (R. 88); nor is there any evidence of the number of acre-
feet Plaintiffs have removed from the Marriott slough at the historic point of diversion 
(R. 84-85); nor, again, is there any evidence of either the annual flow in the Marriott 
slough (R. 88) or the amount of water Plaintiffs have annually pumped from it (id). 
Moreover, Plaintiffs claim to have had difficulty in getting enough water from the 
Marriott slough only between 1979 and 1997 (R. 84), before Mr. Howard's dike had even 
been built. 
As a matter of law, then, Plaintiffs could not possibly prove interference with their 
water right, since both reason and the evidence demonstrate that they have suffered 
neither diminution nor pej oration of their water. In fact, Plaintiff Wayment admitted in 
his deposition and at trial that Plaintiffs' ability to get water from the slough has actually 
improved since the mid«90s: 
Q. So is the ability to water out of the slough better now than it 
was - - let's say in 2002 than it was in 1995? 
A. Yes, I think. Yes, it is, but it's not better than it was back in 
1970 and 1975 in there. 
(R. 315, 660; see also R. 1571 at 70.) What evidence there is, in sum, shows that 
Plaintiffs have always received, and have unabashedly taken, far more than their water 
right allows them to. 
Accordingly, there is absolutely no evidence that can support an interference 
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claim. No evidence shows a decrease in flow. No evidence shows a decrease in pumping 
capacity. In fact, the only evidence shows that Plaintiffs actually have had fewer 
problems with obtaining their water since Mr. Howard put in his dike. 
2. Plaintiffs Cannot Claim Additional Water. 
Basic Utah water law thus clearly establishes that Mr. Howard has not interfered 
with the quantity or quality of water to which Plaintiffs are entitled. Nonetheless, 
Plaintiffs argued successfully below that Mr. Howard has interfered with their water right 
because, having "supplemented" the water in the Marriott slough, they are entitled to 
remove more water than they are permitted—and, naturally, that the dike somehow, 
inexplicably, forestalls their wonted overuse. 
a. Water which Plaintiffs have added to the 
Marriott slough is no longer theirs. 
Even without considering that they readily admit they have no evidence that they 
have been shorted any water at all, because they have no records of withdrawals from the 
Marriott slough {see pages 18-19, supra), Plaintiffs' underlying premise is flawed. They 
assume that the so-called "supplemental water" they add to the Marriott slough—water 
from the Warren Canal—is somehow molecularly distinguishable from the other water in 
the slough, and that they may therefore use it despite the limitations of the plain language 
of their Certified Water Right. In other words, Plaintiffs claim that there are two classes 
of water in the slough: original slough water and added Warren Canal water. Based upon 
this notion, Plaintiffs contend that although the original slough water may be subject tc 
the limitations of the water right, they may still, without restriction, recapture and reuse 
the Warren Canal water they have added, which they apparently believe retains it< 
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identity even after being dumped into the slough. This very argument, however, has been 
rejected on numerous occasions by the Utah Supreme Court. 
When water that is diverted from a water source either (1) returns to the same 
stream system, or (2) commingles with water in the natural water table, it is no longer 
subject to the rule of recapture and reuse. Estate of Steed v. New Escalante Irrigation Co., 
846 P.2d 1223, 1226 (Utah 1992) (citing East Bench Irrigation Co. v. Deseret Irrigation 
Co., 2 Utah 2d 170, 271 P.2d 499 (Utah 1954); Stubbs v. Ercanbrack, 13 Utah 2d 45, 368 
P.2d 461 (Utah 1962)). Stubbs explains that once irrigation water "becomes commingled 
with the waters in the natural water table it has lost its identity as irrigation water and is 
no longer owned by the defendants as such." 368 P.2d at 464. Further, Stubbs makes 
clear that once the water commingles with the water in the natural water table, the rights 
that others have in that stream system attach to that water. "[T]o whatever extent [the 
downstream appropriators] had lawfully established prior rights to the use of water from 
these sources, their rights are entitled to protection and [the upstream appropriator] may 
not encroach thereon and usurp their water by means of his drains and pumps." Id. 
(emphasis added). 
The Marriott slough, of course, is a part of the Little Weber Creek, a natural water 
course. Plaintiffs admit to transferring water from the Warren Canal into the Little Weber 
Creek and Marriot slough (R. 181, 226), commingling the canal water with the water in 
the natural water table and a natural river system. As a result, the water can no longer be 
identified as Plaintiffs'; instead, it is subject to the established prior rights of water-right 
owners in the Little Weber Creek system. 
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b. Plaintiffs have no legal right to "supplement" 
the water in the Marriott slough. 
"Rights to the use of the unappropriated public waters in this state may be 
acquired only as provided in [Title 73]." UCA § 73-3-1. Title 73 provides that "in order . 
. . to acquire the use of any unappropriated public water in the state [a person] shall . . . 
make an application in writing to the state engineer." Id. § 73-3-2. Only after an 
application has been made and approved, necessary construction has been made, water 
has been applied to beneficial use, and proof of these things is made, may a certificate of 
appropriation be given to the applicant. See id. §§ 73-3-10, -11, -12, -16, -17. "The 
certificate is [the water user's] deed; his evidence of title, good, at least against the state, 
for all it purports to be, and good as against every one else who cannot show a superior 
right." Lake Shore Duck Club v. Lake View Duck Club, 50 Utah 76, 166 P. 309, 311 
(1917). The certificate specifies 
the quantity of water in acre-feet or the flow in second-feet appropriated, 
the purpose for which the water is used, the time during which the water is 
to be used each year, the name of the stream or source of supply from 
which the water is diverted . . . and such other matter as will fully and 
completely define the extent and conditions of actual application of the 
water to a beneficial use . . . . 
UCA § 73-3-17. Water users have no other right to water than appears in their certificate. 
Water-right holders desiring to change any aspect of their certificate of 
appropriation {e.g., the point of diversion or the nature, place, or period of use), they musl 
file a change application and have the applications approved by the State Engineer. See 
UCA § 73-3-3. If a water-right holder intends to take "appropriated water" from a canal 
place it in another body of water, and then redivert it therefrom, he or she must file ai 
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Exchange Application and, again, obtain state-engineer approval. Id. § 73-3-20. 
Additionally, to store water in another body of water, an additional change application 
must be filed to establish a point of diversion for the place of storage. See id. § 73-3-2(d). 
To do as they are doing, Plaintiffs, pursuant to UCA § 73-3-20, should have filed 
an exchange application showing the supplementation of the waters in the Marriott 
slough. They did not. Additionally, pursuant to UCA § 73-3-2(10)(d), they should have 
established a point of diversion for the right to store the water in the Marriott slough. This 
they have refused to do. Having failed to follow Utah law, Plaintiffs have no right to the 
"supplemental water" in the slough. Id. § 73-3-1 ("Rights to the use of the unappropriated 
public waters in this state may be acquired only as provided in this title.") 
Because Plaintiffs have no right to the "supplemental water" added to the Marriott 
slough, they cannot point to it to establish that they actually have more water than is 
reflected in their single certificate of appropriation. Nor can they rely on so-called 
"supplemental water" as a basis to divert more water than their water right gives them, 
and they have no measurements demonstrating any lack of water anyway. 
B. No Disputed Material Facts Barred Entry of Summary 
Judgment. 
Having established that Mr. Howard was entitled as a matter of law to the 
dismissal of Plaintiffs5 interference claim, we must examine the trial court's erroneous 
determination that material facts were at issue the precluded entry of summary judgment. 
1* Plaintiffs9 Claims were Barred by Res Judicata. 
The trial court's main error in this regard was its determination that Plaintiffs' 
claims were not barred by the doctrine of res judicata. (R. 273.) Actually, however, in a 
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prior administrative decision, In the Matter of Application No, 35-10520 (AT 1312) 
(February 26, 1999) (a copy is attached at Add. Tab D), the State Engineer had found and 
propounded key facts entirely undermining Plaintiffs' interference claim. Plaintiffs were 
therefore barred by issue preclusion from introducing any facts to the contrary, making it 
impossible for them even to state a prima facie case, to say nothing of prevailing. 
As the Court is aware, issue preclusion (collateral estoppel), which prevents 
relitigation of issues already determined in a previous action, Macris & Assoc, v. Neways, 
Inc., 2000 UT 93, p 4 , 16 P.2d 1214, takes effect upon the satisfaction of four conditions: 
(1) the issue in both actions must be identical; 
(2) the judgment must have been final with respect to that issue; 
(3) the issue must have been fully, fairly, and competently litigated in the 
first action; 
(4) the party who is precluded from litigating the issue must be either a 
party to the first action or a privy of a party. 
See id. at [^37. 
In December 1998, Plaintiffs filed the Application to "appropriate 260.0 acre-feet 
from Marriott slough," which water, they claimed, was "water that runs off of upper 
fields that collects in the Marriott slough." (R. 96.) Throughout the application process, 
Plaintiffs argued that they sought 
to appropriate waste or seepage water, originally diverted from the Weber 
River, and which has found its way into Marriott slough. This water is 
foreign water in the slough and is subject to appropriation and use by 
application. Specifically, the water at issue constitutes seepage or waste 
water that drains from irrigation practices on Applicants' land and 
neighboring lands into Marriott slough. Because the Weber River is not 
naturally tributary to Marriott slough, this water is foreign to the slough and 
is subject to recapture and reuse by the original appropriator. 
(R. 148; Request for Reconsideration, March 17, 1999) (a copy is attached at Add. Ta 
Paee 
E). In spite of Plaintiffs' argument, however, the State Engineer rejected their application, 
having correctly determined that "sufficient unappropriated water to satisfy this 
application is not available" (R. 96; Add. Tab D), and that "[a]fter water collects in the 
Marriott slough (or Little Weber Creek), it [loses] its unique identity as water which may 
have been appropriated and used by the applicant and becomes the source of supply for 
other rights on the Marriott slough." (R. 96.) This ruling was not appealed to the district 
court. 
The issues in the present dispute are obviously identical to those in Plaintiffs' 
application proceeding. Directly at issue in both matters were the Plaintiffs' water rights 
in the Marriott slough. Plaintiffs assert in the instant case that Lee Howard has interfered 
with Plaintiffs' ability to use the water they have directed into the Marriott slough from 
the Warren Canal. Aside from its illegality as an unauthorized diversion (Plaintiffs 
having submitted no exchange application before diverting canal water into the slough), 
Plaintiffs' introduction of canal water into the slough, as discussed above (Section 
II.B.2.b), deprived the canal water of its separate character, removing it from Plaintiffs' 
control. More importantly, though, for present purposes, this is precisely the same 
argument Plaintiffs made unsuccessfully before the State Engineer. 
It is undisputed that the State Engineer's 1999 decision on Plaintiffs' application 
to appropriate was final and was not appealed. And it is indisputable that res judicata 
applies to such administrative decisions: 
Res judicata, which subsumes the doctrine of collateral estoppel, applies to 
administrative adjudications in Utah . . . [T]he principles of res judicata 
apply to enforce repose when an administrative agency has acted in a 
judicial capacity in an adversary proceeding to resolve a controversy over 
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legal rights and to apply a remedy. 
Career Service Review Board v. Utah Department of Corrections, 942 P.2d 933, 938 
(Utah 1997) (internal citations omitted). The Career Service Court went on to point out 
that the Department of Corrections had "declined its opportunity to appeal and cannot 
now successfully argue that the . . . grievance is still pending." Id. at 939. The Court held 
that the Review Board's decision was final and that res judicata applied thereto. 
The State Engineer's decision as to Plaintiffs' application was likewise a final 
adm' 'strative adjudication of the status of the canal water Plaintiffs diverted into the 
Marriott slough. Plaintiffs could have appealed the decision, UCA § 73-3-14, but chose 
not to (R 82). This satisfies the second element of issue preclusion. 
The issue was also fully and fairly litigated. During the application to appropriate 
proceeding the State Engineer considered (1) Plaintiffs' application, (2) protests by the 
Howards and others, (3) Plaintiffs' Answer to the protests, (4) the protestants replies tc 
the Answer (5) Plaintiffs' Request for Reconsideration, (6) the Howards' Response ii 
Onvosition to Request for Reconsideration, and (7) held an informal hearing. (R. 66-67. 
The issue of water rights in the Marriott slough vis-a-vis Plaintiffs' rediversion plans wa 
thus fully and fairly litigated, satisfying the third element of issue preclusion. 
The fourth element of issue preclusion is not disputed: Plaintiffs in the presei 
action are the petitioners who appeared before the State Engineer. 
Plaintiffs were, consequently, barred from asserting in the instant case that t] 
water diverted from the Warren Canal and added to the water in the Marriott slouj 
retains a separate identity. The trial court therefore erred in permitting such allegatio 
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and, ultimately, accepting them and denying Lee Howard's summary judgment. 
2. There were no Material Facts at Issue. 
a. The trial court failed to establish which 
material facts it believed to be at issue, despite 
its being required to do so. 
The rules of civil procedure clearly set forth the procedure to be followed where a 
court finds that a dispute over material facts bars entry of summary judgment: 
If on motion under this rule judgment is not rendered upon the whole case 
or for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of 
the motion, by examining the pleadings and the evidence before it and by 
interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material facts 
exist without substantial controversy and what material facts are actually 
and in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon make an order specifying 
the facts that appear without substantial controversy . . . and directing such 
further proceedings in the action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the 
facts so specified shall be deemed established, and the trial shall be 
conducted accordingly. 
URCP Rule 56(d) (emphasis added). However, despite the rule's plainly placing upon 
trial courts the duty to ascertain which facts are undisputed and which disputed when 
addressing a summary judgment motion, the trial court flatly refused the task: 
[Tjhere are numerous minor and major disputed issues of material facts. 
The Court does not intend to list or itemize all the disputed facts. In a 
motion for summary judgment, it is not the Court's role to sort through and 
sift out all the facts that are "thrown at it" to determine which facts are 
disputed and which are not. 
(R. 272.) 
The Howards, of course, were disappointed by the trial court's taking this position, 
not only because the court's failure to opine as to which facts were actually in dispute 
burdens the Howards with a review of all of Plaintiffs' alleged disputes of material fact 
Plaintiffs raised below, but also because those "material facts" are neither material nor, in 
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some cases, facts at all. 
b The "material facts" Plaintiffs disputed below 
were neither material nor, in some cases, facts. 
^ ^ ^ ^ ^ First, whether the 
n e o n l y relevant question on summary judgment was whether the Howards had 
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each year. Only if Plaintiffs can prove that the Howards have interfered with that right 
are they entitled to prevail. Plaintiffs, however, did not dispute the entire absence of 
evidence that they have not taken that amount from the slough (see R. 309, ^ 13); to the 
contrary, Plaintiffs admit that they have diverted more than 75 acre-feet each year at 
issue, that they have watered lands outside of the 25 acres appurtenant to the right, that 
they have pumped at a rate far above 0.5 cfs, and that they have irrigated outside of the 
period permitted by the right. Moreover, the Plaintiffs presented no evidence of the flow 
rates in the slough. 
Whether the Howards' dike has interfered with the flow of water is immaterial 
unless it were to be offered to show interference with Plaintiffs' water right. As explained 
above, however, there is no evidence that the dike has interfered with the water right; 
there isn't even any evidence that the dike has interfered with Plaintiffs' overuse of water 
at all. Plaintiffs nevertheless relied heavily before the trial court upon Lasson v. Seely, 
238 P.2d 418 (Utah 1951), for the proposition that they somehow have a right to have the 
slough flow as it has historically has, without the dike, despite an entire lack of any 
evidence of actual interference. This reliance is fatally flawed. 
Lasson, the plaintiff, was "the owner of the right to use the waters of Panawats 
slough." Id. at 419. In fact, he had the right to "the entire flow of Panawats slough." Id. at 
423. Seely, the defendant, dammed the slough, expressly to raise the water level to assist 
in the irrigation of his property. See id. at 419-20. Two weeks later, Lasson, who 
measured the flow of the water in the slough, discovered that the flow had decreased. See 
id at 420. Following the slough upstream, he discovered Seely's dam, which held back 
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the water and substantially slowed the flow so that little water passed. See id. About a 
week later, Lasson returned and tore out the dam. See id. However, during the time that 
the dam was in, there was only one day on which the flow decreased substantially below 
0.51 cfs. See id. Even after the dam was removed, the flow in the slough averaged 0.51 
cfs. 
After trial, the court found that Lasson had been damaged during the period the 
dam was in and entered judgment in his favor "for partial loss of crops as well as for the 
expense of tearing out the dam. The trial court entered a restraining order enjoining Seely 
from constructing or maintaining any dam in the slough, except that he was permitted 
to construct check dams of such character as 4not to destroy the present 
perpendicular banks or alter the bed of said stream, or appreciably interfere with or 
obstruct the usual, ordinary and continuous flow of the water therein to the 
plaintiffs land," Id. at 420 (emphasis added). 
The Supreme Court reversed the order in part, eliminating the damages for the 
crop loss because the Supreme Court held that Lasson had failed "to show he was 
deprived of water for more than a day." Id. at 423. However, it upheld the remainder o 
the trial court's decision, with slight modifications. See id. 
A review of these facts makes clear that Lasson does not stand for the propositioi 
that a party can state a claim of interference without showing actual interference. Firs 
Lasson had the right to the entire flow of the Panawats slough.37 Thus, there was n 
question that he had the right to the entire flow of the water in the entire slough. Despil 
37 
In this case, it was established at trial that there are others with water rights on tl 
Little Weber Creek downstream from the Marriott slough. (R. 1573 at 377-79.) 
this fact, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's conclusion that Lasson had 
established an interference claim when the evidence showed that, although the dam was 
in the slough, the dam actually interfered with the flow on only one day. See id. at 423. 
The Court expressly stated that "[i]f the same amount of water seeped through the dam as 
flowed in the stream bed after the dam was removed, it could hardly be said that the dam 
stopped the flow of the water or diminished the quantity." Id. Further, the Court 
permitted Seely to continue to place dams in the slough, so long as the placement did not 
interfere with the flow of the water. 
Thus, the Lasson case actually strongly supports Mr. Howard's position. Despite 
the fact that Lasson had the right to the entire flow of the slough, which Plaintiffs in this 
case do not have, Lasson could not prevail on a claim for interference when a dam—not a 
dike, as in this case—was placed in the slough unless he showed actual interference with 
the flow in the slough. The placement of the dam was not assumed to cause interference. 
Since Lasson could only prove interference with measurements on one day, the judgment 
awarding him damages for crop loss was reversed. 
ii. The four acre-foot duty—a question of law. Plaintiffs' certificate of 
appropriation explicitly defines the applicable irrigation duty as "three acre-feet of water 
per acre of land irrigated per annum" {see R. 78, Add. Tab B). Plaintiffs' second 
purported "material fact" in dispute, however, was their contradictory claim to a duty of 
four acre-feet per acre of land appurtenant to the water right (R. 379) based upon an 
unauthenticated "Utah Appropriation Policy" setting forth the "general irrigation 
diversion duty" for western Weber County allegedly appearing on a website maintained 
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by the State Engineer. Whether Plaintiffs' certificate of appropriation trumps their 
webpage printout, however, is not a question of fact, but a question of law. 
A water user's "certificate [of appropriation] is his deed; his evidence of title . . . 
.," Lake Shore Duck Club v. Lake View Duck Club, 50 Utah 76, 166 P. 309, 311 (1917); 
and, as is well-known, "[i]n the absence of ambiguity, the construction of deeds is a 
question of law for the court . . . ." Hartman v. Potter, 596 P.2d 653, 656 (Utah 1979) 
(footnotes omitted). In addition, like any other written instrument (such as a certificate of 
appropriation), "where a deed is plain and unambiguous, parol evidence is not admissible 
to vary its terms. It is the court's duty to construe a deed as it is written." Id. 
The trial court, however, ignored the plain language of the certificate and the 
applicable case law, relying instead upon the worldwide web. 
Quite aside from the fact that the duties reflected (whether accurately o 
inaccurately) in Plaintiffs' webpage printout have not gone through the mandate! 
rulemaking process39 necessary to give any policy or proposed regulation the force c 
law—and that it cannot therefore take precedence over a certificate of appropriatio 
issued pursuant to UCA § 73-3-17 (or its predecessor provisions)—an area's "genen 
irrigation diversion duty," assuming arguendo that such have any legal force at all, 
applicable to a particular water right only where no specific duty has been prescribed in 
certificate of appropriation. This is explicitly acknowledged in the page from the intern 
38
 The reference appearing on Plaintiffs' printout is http://www.waterrights.utah gc 
wrinfo/policy/wrareas/area35. html. 
"The state engineer shall make rules, in accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46a, Uti 
Administrative Rulemaking Act, consistent with the purposes and provisions of this titl 
. . . " UCA § 73-2-1(4) (emphasis added). 
Pag 
that Plaintiffs quote from: 
The general irrigation diversion duty for this area, which the State 
Engineer uses for evaluation purposes, is 4.0 acre-feet per acre per year 
(af/ac) in valley regions of western Weber County . . . . The consumptive 
use requirements are determined from the publication Consumptive Use of 
Irrigated Crops in Utah, Research Report 145, Utah State University, 1994, 
unless the applicant submits other data for consideration. 
(R. 397 (emphasis added).) Self-evidently, then, these "general irrigation diversion 
duties" are not set-in-stone directives, but rather presumptive guidelines for the 
determination of consumptive use for each acre appurtenant to a particular water right. 
Were a certificate of appropriation, for example, to give its holder the right to divert 1.0 
cfs, define the place of use as a 10-acre plot in western Weber County, but leave the duty 
unspecified, the general practice is to assume that the State Engineer's presumptive 
guidelines operate to establish a duty limitation of four acre-feet of water for each acre 
appurtenant to the right. The certificate holder would thus be permitted only 40 acre-feet 
per annum. 
As noted in the webpage to which Plaintiffs cite, the presumptive guidelines are 
based upon figures found in a particular study. However, the "policy" also provides that 
the duty for a particular parcel can differ from the amount given in the general guidelines 
if an applicant submits data showing that a different consumptive use applies. In such a 
case, the State Engineer might set an entirely different duty limitation. If he does so, that 
duty limitation will be expressed in the certificate of appropriation—just as it is in the 
present dispute. Accordingly, the "general irrigation diversion duty" limitation does not 
act, and, having no legal force, cannot act, to differ the express terms of the certificate of 
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appropriation. 
iil The four acre-foot duty—a lack of foundation. In addition to relying upon an 
internet printout instead of established law, the trial court took judicial notice of the 
alleged "Utah Appropriation Policy" despite Plaintiffs' having wholly failed to establish 
the foundational elements necessary for such notice to be taken. 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 201(b), provides in relevant part as follows: 
A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in 
that it is either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the 
trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to 
sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. 
In this case, Plaintiffs relied upon the second of the rule's methods for taking judicia 
notice. In doing so, they relied on Moore v. Utah Technical College, 727 P.2d 634 (Utal 
1986) (R. 379). There, the Utah Supreme Court stated that it could "take judicial notice o 
administrative rules and regulations as well as published accounts of administrativi 
proceedings and actions." 727 P.2d at 639, n.17. 
The problem with Plaintiffs' reliance on Moore, however, is that the Moore Com 
was relying on a publication of an administrative policy that had been formally adopte 
and published in book form by the agency. See id. In this case, on the other hanc 
Plaintiffs cited to no adopted rule or regulation of the agency. Instead, they pointed 1 
their printout: hardcopy of a webpage. Besides the lack of authentication by one havir 
knowledge that the print-out was actually a true and correct copy of the webpage on tl 
Even if the trial court were correct, the Plaintiffs still admit to taking far more wat 
than they are entitled to take under their rights for the 18.86 acres they actually own. S\ 
supra note 34. 
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website, the print-out is both incomplete41 and explicitly unreliable. The website contains 
an explicit disclaimer, in fact, as to its own accuracy. (See R. 677.) 
An agency's regular, formal adoption and publication of rules and policies in book 
form differs significantly from potentially outdated or inaccurate information provided as 
a convenience on a website. This potential unreliability (avowed and cautioned against on 
most such websites) removes internet printouts such as Plaintiffs' "Appropriation Policy" 
from the roster of Rule 201(b)(2)'s contemplated "sources whose accuracy cannot 
reasonably be questioned." To the contrary, such sources should routinely be questioned 
and double checked before anyone relies upon them.42 Plaintiffs should not have asked 
the trial court to take, and the trial court never should have taken, judicial notice of the 
printout upon which Plaintiffs relied for their claim to four acre-feet per acre. 
iv. Improper irrigation. Plaintiffs also claim that there was a factual dispute as to 
whether they improperly irrigated land outside of the 25 acres specifically appurtenant to 
the water right at issue in this case. This, however, was not a factual issue but another 
legal one. Additionally, the affidavit of Edward England, upon which Plaintiffs relied, 
establishes only that England has been watering certain property other than the 25 acres 
at issue (although he does not identify which property) from Warren Irrigation shares. It 
did not establish that England could legally take water from the Marriott slough for that 
42 3? e f l r s t P a§ e cuts off the text of the right margin (R. 393). 
sewhere on the Water Rights website, for example, a stockwatering table provides 
be call ? ° W i n g h o w m u c h w a t e r various animals require (the "livestock duty" it might 
3y4. a ^ ) : a h o r s e gets about 25 gallons a day; a pig, about 5 gallons; an ostrich, almost 
howeve^' a b 0 U t ^ a n d & c h i c k e n ' a r o u n d 3/4 o f a gallon per day. Foxes and mink, 
11-2 table X° a n e r r o n e o u s l y inserted zero, are permitted a daily water ration of only 
error is
 x^
Sp
^
ons
 (see http://www'.waterrights.utah.gov/wrinfo/policy/wateruse.asp). This 
ucn talked of among mink farmers, but it has yet to be corrected. 
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same time (R. 372, 380). The affidavit asserted only that the Warren shares have been the 
source of irrigation water for unidentified property; it did not even identify the point of 
diversion. (See id.) 
v. The sufficiency of water from the slough. Plaintiffs' next purported factual 
dispute was whether they have had sufficient water to irrigate from their approved water 
right. Plaintiffs "evidence" on this point was their own allegation that they have had to 
supplement the water in the slough with Warren Irrigation water. But this is not 
"evidence"; it is a legal argument susceptible only to a legal determination. It is most 
certainly not a disputed issue of material fact. 
Plaintiffs' water right allows them to divert 0.5 cfs from May 1st to September 30li 
each year up to a total of 75 acre-feet, to be applied on a specific 25 acres. They admittec 
they have no other water right in the Marriott slough. They also admitted that they hav< 
diverted more than 0.5 cfs from the slough, diverted far more than 75 acre feet of wate 
per year, diverted during periods outside of May 1st to September 30th each year, an 
irrigated more than the 25 acres identified in the water right. 
They also readily admitted that their only complaint with Mr. Howard's dike 
that the pipes in the dike are, in their opinion, too high. When England was asked 
deposition to explain why he was concerned with the dike, he stated: 
Q. Tell me what those concerns are. 
A. It impedes the flow of water. 
Q. How can you tell it does that? Tell me what things you've observed 
that tell you that. 
A. Well, before it was there the water flowed on the bottom of the 
creek. Okay? The bottom of the slough. 
Q. Okay. 
A. And it was not impeded. Now that its there, there's no way for the 
water to travel at the bottom of the slough. The pipes that are 
installed are elevated above the bottom of the slough by some - I 
estimate about 18 inches. 
(R. 657.) Wayment agreed: "Q. So, in your view, the pipe should be further down or 
more submerged? A. Right. If it was like that, we wouldn't be here today" (R. 660). In 
fact, Wayment admitted in his deposition that the ability to get water from the slough was 
better now than in 1995, before the Howards' dike was constructed. 
Q. So is the ability to water out of the slough better now than it was— 
let's say in 2002 than it was in 1995? 
A. Yes, I think. Yes, it is, but it's not better than it was back in 1970 
and 1975 in there. 
(R. 660.) Plaintiffs thus cannot credibly or rationally claim any interference with their 
water right, since they receive all the water to which they are entitled, and a great deal 
more to which they have no entitlement whatever. 
vi. Improper storage. Plaintiffs claim that whether they improperly store water on 
their land is a disputed issue of material fact. Plaintiffs claim that they are entitled to store 
the water pursuant to their Application to Appropriate. This, yet again, however, is a legal 
argument requiring yet another legal conclusion. And in any case, quite aside from their 
arguments attempting to rationalize their illegal storage of slough water, Plaintiffs have 
still to address their illegal diversion of Warren Irrigation water to storage in the slough 
without ever having filed the required exchange or change application—which is itself 
another legal argument. 
yii. Purpose for the Dike. The last of Plaintiffs' purported disputes of material 
facts was whether Mr. Howard built his dike to control cattle or to control the slough. Just 
as above {see Section II.B.2.b.i, supra), this is immaterial. Intention has nothing to do 
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ith a determination as to whether Plaintiffs' water rights were interfered with or not. 
C. Conclusion to Part II. 
This matter never should have gone beyond summary judgment: Plaintiffs have 
ffered no interference with their water right or their use (and abuse) of water 
thereunder. Plaintiffs have not even shown a diminution in the flows through the slough. 
Tn fact, Plaintiffs obtain more water now than before the Howards' dike was built. 
The "disputed material facts" to which Plaintiffs successfully pointed below were 
. fact legal arguments or irrelevancies. No genuine issues of material fact existed to bai 
ummary judgment, and the Howards were entitled to judgment as a matter of law or 
Plaintiffs' First and Second Claims for Relief. 
Finally, the trial court's adoption of Plaintiffs' position makes no legal (o 
nractical) sense. Moreover, ruling in Plaintiffs' favor, despite Plaintiffs' admissions the 
they have sufficient water and are indeed illegally using more water than they ar 
permitted, stands Utah water law on its head. 
Lee Howard was entitled to entry of summary judgment and the dismissal < 
Plaintiffs' first and second claims for relief. The trial court erred in refusing to grant reli< 
accordingly. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINAL JUDGMENT MUST BE REVERSED, 
BASED AS IT IS UPON UNSUPPORTED FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
INCORRECT CONCLUSIONS OF LAW. 
A. The Evidence does not Support Several of the Trial 
Court's Critical Findings of Fact. 
1. Plaintiffs9 Diversion of Water, Historically, was not 
Based upon a Pumping and Refilling Cycle. 
Much of the trial court's FF&CL rest upon the court's acceptance of an alleged 
"pumping and refilling cycle": 
4. A ["diversion] dam" . . . on the north end of the slough is 
used and has always been used to allow the slough to fill so that the water 
can then be pumped to plaintiffs' crops. After pumping, the slough refills, 
and then when needed, the pump is turned on for another watering cycle. 
This process is referred to below as the "pumping and refilling cycle." 
6. The water right Application describes the nature of the slough 
and how the water was/is obtained. The pumping cycle is described in the 
Proof of Appropriation. 
8. This pumping and refilling cycle is how plaintiffs' water right 
has been used historically 
9. The original appropriator, Mary E. Marriot, explained in her 
June 10, 1915, letter to the State Engineer how the slough operated when 
the water right was first approved. She explained that she used the dam at 
the end of the slough to fill the slough and store water, allowing it to be 
pumped for irrigation. 
10. At the end of the irrigating season, the diversion dam was 
breached, allowing the slough to empty. That is how the slough and the 
water right are used today. Plaintiffs' water right cannot be use without this 
pumping and refilling cycle. 
(R. 1330-31.) The evidence, however, does not support these findings. 
a. Marsh ailing of th e evidence. 
Defendants introduced into evidence Mary E. Marriott's March 6, 1913, 
Application to Appropriate Water for irrigation. (Tr.Exh. 102, Tab 18.) In the 
"Explanatory" section, Marriott wrote (and Plaintiff Wayment read into the record), 
The source of this slough is drainage and waste water and it is not probable 
that a continuous flow of one sec.ft. can be obtained, but it is the intention 
of the appropriator to pump as much as possible at a time and then resting 
until [sic] the slough fills again. 
(R. 1571 at 41.) Wayment then testified, 
This is the way the slough was operated all my life, it's operated the way 
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my father had it and we've had it, is the water come in, we let it rest and 
then we pumped it and that cycle continued to keep us in water. 
{Id) Defendants then introduced the following "General Remarks" from the Proof of 
Appropriation for Marriott's water right (No. 5095) (Tr.Exh. 102, Tab 19): 
The flow measured as follows: "H" = .62', "L" = 1\ Q = 1.626 sec.ft. The 
above flow is not continuous. The pump used is a No 5 American with a 
capacity of 735 gals, per minute. During the season of 1914 the plant was 
operated a day then it would be necessary to wait a day or so untill [sic] the 
slough would refill before continuing. The slough supplied water for only 
25 acres in 1914, but there are 50 acres in condition to irrigate and the 
slough will supply sufficient water (1 sec. foot continuous) nearly every 
season. 
The above measurement was taken when the plant was working its 
full capacity. The plant is operated 24 hrs. and then rests 48 hrs., the 
average flow being 0.53 cu. ft. per sec. 
(R. 1571 at 42-43.) There followed a brief colloquy: 
Q All right. Now, . . . where it says that during the season of 1914, the 
plant was operated a day and then it was necessary to wait a day or 
so until the slough would refill before continuing. . . . [H]ow does 
that description compare with the way you've been irrigating since 
you've been on that land? 
A That is the same way we have operated. We have never changed 
from this system. 
{id at 43), after which a brief letter from Marriott to the State Engineer was read into t 
record (spelling, punctuation, indentation, and capitalization as in original): 
Dear Sir in regards the application No 5095 for water 
I will try to explain I close the dam as Soon as I start Watering and 
hold it all in Slue and last year I Watered crop 4 times running Engine three 
days and nights or 72 hours each time and the Slue was dry by the last of 
August When the water is taken out of the river for irrigation There is very 
little Sokage comes in the Slue so I have to store the water I am Writing 
this to give you some Idea of the quantity of water 
I use a No 5 American pump and raise water 17ft 
(R. 1571 at 43-44, Tr.Exh. 102 Tab 22.) Wayment then testified that Plaintiffs curre 
operate "[t]he same way. We're still irrigating the same way today." (R. 44.) 
England later testified similarly, though in less detail: 
O All right. You heard Mr. Wayment testify about the pumping and 
refilling cycle that he's described and you heard me read from the 
water right file about how the slough fills, the pump, rest. Is that 
consistent with how the slough's been operated since you've been on 
the property? 
A Yes. 
(R. 1571 at 151.) 
b. The evidence does not support the trial courts 
findings. 
In adducing this evidence, Plaintiffs implicitly argued—and the trial court 
apparently agreed that certain statements made in the applications to appropriate control 
over the express language of the certificates of appropriation. However, even if the 
application could be read to grant Plaintiffs such broad authority, the certificate of 
appropriation is the controlling legal document, not the application. In Little v. Greene & 
Weed Investment, 839 P.2d 791, 795 (Utah 1992), the Utah Supreme Court reaffirmed 
that water rights are not appurtenant to land until a water right certificate had been issued. 
In doing so, the Court explained that one of the practical reasons for its decision was that 
the certificate of appropriation, the controlling legal document, may grant rights different 
r o m
 ti^se requested in the proof and application. "[BJecause the extent of the water use 
aimed in the proof of appropriation and the extent of use ultimately certified by the 
gmeer m a y differ, a grantee of land may not receive the entire water use believed 
aPpurtenant and presumably purchased at the time of the transfer, if mere proof of 
ProPnation were sufficient to make water appurtenant to land." Id. at 796. It is 
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, that the proof of appropriation does not grant rights, but the certificate of 
therefore clear tnai 
• M(SeealsoR. 1572 at258.) 
appropriation. <Peea
 < 
v argument based upon what the application or proof might say is of no 
Thus, any <*& 
The certificate of appropriation alone controls. In this case, it is clear: This 
significance, ine 
,it,ed the holder to use five-tenths of a cubic foot of water per second 
certificate entitled u> 
,
 f n r the land area described; but, the said holder is not entitled by vrtue of 
intermittently i° r ™ 
ificate to use to exceed the equivalent of three acre-feet of water per acre of land 
„um " Plaintiffs have no additional rights, either to store water or to pump 
irrigated per annui . 
at a higher flow rate. 
Plaintiffs, perhaps recognizing the inherent problems in their arguments, use the 
^ <toppel and adverse possession, claiming that the right has always been usee 
language ot esiuyF 
,
 w a v or that they have always pumped more than 0.5 cfs from the slough 
a particular way " 
Utah water law is not subject to these doctrines. UCA § 73-3-1 states: "No right to th 
Z of water either appropriated or unappropriated can be acquired by adverse use o 
^ l e possession." Similarly the doctrine of estoppel is inapplicable to the facts of thi 
adVCTSc Well^iUe E. Field Irrigations Co. v. Lindsay Land & Livestock Co., 104 Ut. 
case, oee 
137 P 2d 634, 645 (Utah 1943). Additionally, because the right to use of wat, 
4
 -ves from the state, both doctrines would necessarily have to be asserted against ti 
TZZZrMA holder disagrees with the amount of diversion rate for wat 
4 J O f C O U r l l c r r t & a T o f Appropriation, he or she has a right to appeal the Sn 
*** '" ? e e S r f t o theDistric. Court. See UCA § 73-3-14 The apped must 
Engineer's °e'e™'"™°
 f m e f m a l a g e n c y action. See UCA § 73-3-14; id. § 63-46 
ffle
g
d within ( tar ty** 4 * a « n E a n g i g n e e / r e v e a l n o s u c h appeal by England, Wayme 
1 4 ( 3 ) ( a )
^er sor-ta- interest for tire 0.5 cfs, 75 acre feet total or3 acre feet d. 
or , h e l 7 tteCertficate of Appropriation for Water Right No. 35-8073. 
State, not the Howards. 
2. The Flow of the Marriott slough is not "Generally 
South to North.9' 
The trial court's FF ]f 20 declares that "[t]he slough has a generally south to north 
f j o w " (R. 1456; Add. Tab J)44 This finding contradicts the evidence. The slough does 
not "generally" flow south to north—if by "generally" the court means to include those 
portions of the slough upon the eastern part of the Howard property ("East Howard 
slough"). On the contrary, the evidence makes it abundantly clear that, while portions of 
the slough—including those on the western half of the Howard property—do flow south 
to north, water in the East Howard slough flows instead through a drain beneath 5900 
West street where it enters a county drainage ditch carrying water from lands further 
north south to the Weber River. 
The Howards cannot marshal evidence which does not exist, of course; and there 
is no evidence at all that water in the East Howard slough naturally flows "northward" 
onto the England property. 
On the other hand, water in the East Howard slough can be forced over the 
northward/eastward watershed and into the north-flowing Marriott slough. (R. 1571 at 
28-29, 1573 at 411-14, 418, 459-60, & 462-65.) By placing a tin in the county drainage 
ditch on the east side of 5900 West, Plaintiffs can (and do) divert the water from the 
The trial court defines the slough as 
beginning] at the north end of property owned by plaintiff Wayment, 
continuing] southward through the England property, then through the Lee 
Howard property, and terminating] at a point identified by the parties as 
/ w Jr^ ' s e P a r a t i o n t i n ' on property owned by Knight Irrigation Company. (^FF^lKAddTabiy) J * * v y 
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county drainage ditch and into the East Howard slough, at the same time blocking any 
water from leaving it (see id.).45 This eventually overfills the East Howard slough 
(flooding the Howards' land in the process), creating the single, enormous, illegal marsh 
whence Plaintiffs draw the stolen water to supply their unlawful overappropriation (R. 
1571 at 480-94). 
3. The Trial Court Abused its Discretion in Ruling that 
the Howards' Dike Interferes with the Plaintiffs9 
Water Right. 
The trial court found that "[t]he [Howards'] dike interferes with plaintiffs' water 
right by affecting the slough and how it naturally operated. The dike has decreased the 
flow of water to plaintiffs' pump and otherwise changed the way the slough functions by 
changing its flow." (R. 1457: FF *h 29 (Add. Tab J).) The court's CL echo this finding: 
"[the Howards'] dike constitutes interference with plaintiffs' water right." (R. 1460: CL *f 
5.) 
a. Standard of Review. 
Because the trial court had "first [to] find facts relevant to the issue . . . and then 
determine whether those facts [were] within the ambit" of interference, this issue is best 
viewed as a mixed question of fact and law. See Searle v. Milburn Irrigation Co., 2005 
UT 58, ^[15, 533 Utah Adv. Rep. 49 (discussing the analogous situation of impairment of 
water rights) (Searle is as yet unpublished; a copy is included at Add. Tab M). In 
"reviewing a district court's conclusion regarding a mixed question of fact and law, 
5
 Plaintiffs, as they are wont, have filed no applications for the diversion, storage, and 
use of this water either. Neither that flowing in the county drainage ditch or that added to 
the resultantly bloated East Howard slough. 
4837-7057-6640.HO951.001 Page 40 
TaDDellate courts] typically grant some level of deference to the district court's 
application of the law to the facts/' id. at |16 (citing State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 937-39 
(Utah 1994)); the "discretion afforded varies, however, according to the issue being 
reviewed," id. (citing State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, ^|26, 63 P.3d 650). The more fact-
sensitive the application of the law to the facts, the greater the discretion a reviewing 
court gives the trial court in the review of its determination as to whether the facts fall 
within the established rule of law. See, e.g., Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, f20, 100 P.3d 
1177. In "extremely fact-sensitive" matters, the marshaling requirement also applies to 
the facts'to which the trial court applied the legal standard. Id. 
The appellate courts in Utah "consider multiple factors when determining how 
much deference to grant a district court's application of law to facts," Searle, 2005 UT 
58, at [^16 (citing Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 1244 (Utah 1998)), that is, in 
determining just how fact-sensitive a given issue is: 
Specifically, we analyze whether (1) the facts at issue are so complex, and 
arise in such variation, that it would be impractical to supply a rule that 
adequately accounts for the implications of all the facts; (2) the context in 
which the application of law to facts occurs is somehow novel or new, such 
that appellate courts are unable to discern and clearly state what factors are 
outcome determinative; and (3) the district court has observed facts that are 
not adequately preserved by a record of the proceedings before it, e.g., 
witness demeanor. 
Id (citing Pena, 869 P.2d at 938-39). 
In the present dispute, however, first, the facts—as embodied in the trial court's 
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FF—are neither varied nor complex. The legal context, second, is hardly "novel": the 
Utah courts have been analyzing interference claims at length for well over a century. 
Indeed, the findings necessary to validate an interference claim have long been 
established: whether or not the claimant is (a) receiving at his point of diversion (b) the 
quantity, and (c) the quality, of water (d) to which his appropriation entitles him. See 
Adams v. Portage Irrigation, Reservoir & Power Co., 95 Utah 1, 72 P.2d 648, 653 (Utah 
1937). Third, and finally, none of the evidence in this case requires the examination of 
"witness demeanor" or other nuances in order for the law to be correctly applied.47 
In Searle, because of "myriad factual scenarios, interplaying with complex 
scientific principles" and the absence of any "meaningful[] constrain^]" in Utah case law 
upon trial court discretion "to conclude that evidence of impairment is sufficient to 
An 
prevent approval of a change application," the Court determined that the district court 
should be granted "at least some deference." 2005 UT 58 at [^17. However, the Searle 
Court then went on to note that, 
given the importance of water in this state, there is a strong public policy 
interest in promoting consistent and predictable results in disputes over the 
permissible use of that water. Therefore, it is appropriate that district court 
discretion be somewhat constrained in this area. 
Although the reasoning behind their promulgation is alarmingly incomprehensible, the 
trial court's FF are nevertheless quite straightforward—they merely require conclusions 
entirely at variance with those the trial court ultimately rendered. 
47
 It is true that the trial court did visit the slough, but the photographic and testimonial 
evidence is sufficiently clear to render the judge's (erroneous) determinations arising 
therefrom merely a gloss on the actual facts adduced at trial. 
48
 The Searle Court also noted the "district court['s] . . . ability to assess witness 
demeanor and credibility, factors that are not readily discernable from a cold record," 
2005 UT 58 at ]fl7 (citation omitted); the Searle decision, however, does not appear to 
have turned upon this factor. 
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Id. at TJ18 (citing Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 1244 (Utah 1998)). As a result, the Court 
concluded that the "district courts enjoy significant, but not broad,49 discretion when 
determining whether evidence of impairment is sufficiently compelling to foreclose 
application approval." Id. (citing Butler, Crockett & Walsh Dev. Corp. v. Pinecrest 
Pipeline Operating Co., 2004 UT 67, f 50, 98 P.3d 1.) 
In the present dispute, where none of the considerations germane in Searle pertain, 
this Court's deference to the trial court's inferences vis-a-vis interference should logically 
be substantially less than Searle's "significant discretion."50 
b. The Trial Court Abused its Discretion by 
Ruling that the Howards Have Interfered with 
Plaintiffs'Water Right. 
As discussed at length above, pp. 6-7, Part II.A, and Part III.A.Lb, q.v., Plaintiffs 
cannot legally prove interference from the facts adduced in the record. 
B. The Trial Court's Final Judgment in Plaintiffs9 Favor was also 
Based in Part upon a Series of Incorrect Conclusions of Law. 
/• Plaintiffs' are Limited by their Water Right to a Duty 
of Only Three Acre-Feet Not the Four Acre-Feet 
Claimed by Plaintiffs and Found by the Court. 
The trial court's FF include a "finding" declaring that 
Plaintiffs and all irrigators in Weber County are entitled to four acre-feet of 
lne spectrum of discretion" runs from "'de novo' on the one hand to 'broad 
discretion' on the other." Pinecrest, 2004 UT 67 at \50 (citing State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 
932, 937 (Utah 1994). "Significant discretion," then, "falls somewhere between the two 
ends of the spectrum." Id. 
mis is especially true in a case where, as here, the district court's ruling in Plaintiffs' 
avor creates an absolute right in any downstream user to bar any upstream use, 
regardless of whether they are receiving their allotted water (or even illegally 
supplementing it)—in blatant disregard for more than a century of Utah water law, under 
e l a ? a d e
 of "protecting their method of appropriation." 
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water per acre of land irrigated. Although the [Plaintiffs'] Certificate [of 
Appropriation] provides for a duty of 3 acre feet per acre irrigated, that duty 
was increased for Weber County. 
(R. 1456: FF % 22 (Add. Tab J).) The trial court, however (and Plaintiffs, who prepared 
the findings), were plainly in error: this is a conclusion of law, not a finding of fact: 
Factual questions are generally regarded as entailing the empirical, such as 
things, events, actions, or conditions happening, existing, or taking place, as 
well as the subjective, such as state of mind. Legal determinations, on the 
other hand, are defined as those which are not of fact but are essentially of 
rules or principles uniformly applied to persons of similar qualities and 
status in similar circumstances. 
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935 (Utah 1994)(citing Ronald R. Hofer, Standards of 
Review—Looking Beyond the Labels, 74 Marq.L.Rev. 231, 236 (1991)). Construction of 
written documents, such as certificates of appropriation, is of course a question of law, 
see Hartman v. Potter, 596 P.2d 653, 656 (Utah 1979), as is a blanket declaration of 
irrigation duties in Weber County, such as the trial court's "Finding" No. 22. This legal 
issue is thus subject to correctness review rather than the factual clear error. 
The Howards discuss at length the primacy of certificates of appropriation over 
any other source—including nonregulatory policies posted on the internet—in Section 
II.B.2.b.ii & iii, above. Commending that discussion to the Court's reperusal, the 
Howards here reiterate only that in construing a deed, such as the Plaintiffs' Certificate of 
Appropriation, a court must "determine . . . intent from the plain language of the four 
corners of the deed." RHN Corp. v. Veibell, 2004 UT 60,1J40, 96 P.3d 935 (quoting Ault 
v. Holden, 2002 UT 33, |38, 44 P.3d 781). Moreover, a court may not look to extrinsic 
evidence, like websites, unless there is an ambiguity in the instrument. Id. (citing 23 
Am. Jur.2d Deeds § 192 (2001).) 
4837-7057-6640.HO951.001 Page 44 
Here, the language at issue could hardly be more plain: "three acre-feet of water 
per acre of land irrigated per annum" (Tr.Exh. 1; Add. Tab B). That is all the water 
Plaintiffs may legally claim, and the trial court erred grievously when it ruled that the 
language of the Certificate had been displaced by a website. 
2. The Howards Never Withdrew their Counterclaim for 
Trespass against Plaintiffs. 
In its Decision of August 23, 2004 (a copy of which is attached at Add. Tab L), the 
Court declared that "the Defendants' trespass claim was formally withdrawn at trial" (R. 
1385). Actually, however, it was Plaintiffs whose trespass claim was dismissed (not 
withdrawn): 
THE COURT: . . . . With all due respect to the plaintiffs, I don't 
think you've proven the trespass specifically against Bill Howard and that 
matter will be dismissed at this particular point. . . . So I am granting [the 
Howards'] Motion to Dismiss on the cause of action in regard to trespass 
on Bill Howard 
MR. SMITH: Thank you, Your Honor, . . . the trespass claim also 
went against Mr. Lee Howard. We ask that that be dismissed against him 
as well. 
THE COURT: . . . . I'll grant that motion. That matter will be 
dismissed as well so that trespass is done. 
(R. 1573 at 330, 333-34.) The Howards never withdrew their trespass counterclaim 
against Plaintiffs. Since the trial court's dismissal of the Howards' counterclaim for 
trespass was based solely on the erroneous notion that the Howards had withdrawn it, the 
dismissal must be reversed and the trespass counterclaim reinstated. 
That their trespass claim is indeed a valid one is equally clear: 
In order to establish a trespass in Utah, a plaintiff must prove that a defendant 
wrongfully entered upon his lands, See Walker Drug Co. v. La Sal Oil Co., 972 P.2d 
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1238, 1243 (Utah 1998) (citing O'Neill v. Sand Pedro, L.A. & S.L.R. Co., 38 Utah 475: 
479, 114 P. 127, 128 (1911)). However, such a defendant is liable for trespass only if "he 
intentionally . . . enters land in the possession of the other, or causes a thing or a thin 
person to do so . . . " Restatement (Second) of Torts § 158(a) (1965): 
The actor, without himself entering the land may invade another's interest 
in its exclusive possession by throwing, propelling, or placing a thing either 
on or beneath the surface of the land or in the air space above it. 
Thus, . . . it is an actionable trespass to throw rubbish on another's land, 
even though he himself uses it as a dump heap, or to fire projectiles or to 
fly an advertising kite or balloon through the air above it, even though no 
harm is done to the land or to the possessor's enjoyment of it. 
Id. cmt. i. In the present case, as discussed extensively above, Plaintiffs have cause 
water to flood onto the Howard property by illegally damming the Marriott sloug 
Having done so, they are liable for trespass and deprived Mr. Howard of the use of h 
own property. 
In this case, as discussed above, Part III.A.2, the evidence showed that Plaintii 
possess no legal right to dam the slough or the drainage ditch. Nor was any eviden 
adduced that the Howard property was ever flooded as part of an irrigation system befc 
1998. 
3. The Howards have a Valid Counterclaim for Negligence 
against Plaintiffs. 
The evidence adduced at trial demonstrated not only that Plaintiffs' cond 
caused a trespass, but also that it rendered them liable for negligence: 
A possessor of land[, declares Utah case law,] is subject to liability to 
others outside of the land for physical harm caused by a structure or other 
artificial condition on the land, which the possessor realizes or should 
realize will involve an unreasonable risk of such harm, if 
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(a) the possessor has created the condition, or 
(b) the condition is created by a third person with the possessor's 
consent or acquiescence while the land is in his possession, or 
(c) the condition is created by a third person without the possessor's 
consent or acquiescence, but reasonable care is not taken to make the 
condition safe after the possessor knows or should know of it. 
AMS Salt Industries, Inc. v. Magnesium Corp., 942 P.2d 315, 322-23 (Utah 1998). Thus, 
a person who creates an artificial condition on land, which he realizes involves an 
unreasonable risk, is liable for any harm done to another person's property caused by his 
conduct. Utah statutory law likewise "imposes an affirmative duty of care upon those 
who divert waters for their own use," Dougherty v. California-Pacific Utilities Company, 
546 P.2d 880, 882 (Utah 1976): "'The owner of any ditch . . . or other watercourse shall 
maintain the same in repair so as to prevent waste of water or damage of property of 
others.'" Id. (quoting UCA § 73-1-8.) 
In this case, the evidence clearly demonstrated that Plaintiffs created an artificial 
condition in the slough by (illegally) damming both the slough itself and contiguous 
county drains, (illegally) diverting water to the slough, and (illegally) storing water 
therein. (R. 1573 at 480-94). These actions caused water to back up in the slough, 
damaging the Howard property. {See id.) Plaintiffs, moreover, acted willfully or with a 
reckless indifference to Mr. Howard's property rights. 
Mr. Howard's negligence claim is thus not only valid but demonstrably correct. 
The trial court was therefore in error when it dismissed it. 
4
- The Howards have a Valid Counterclaim for Nuisance 
against Plaintiffs. 
Non-trespassory invasions of a person's interest in the use and enjoyment of land 
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resulting from another's interference with the flow of surface water" are claims for 
nuisance. See Sanford v University of Utah, 26 Utah 2d 285, 488 P.2d 741, 744 (Utah 
1971), superceded by statute on other grounds. "[W]here one person drains or cultivates 
his land, grades it, [etc.] . . ., he usually interferes with the flow of surface water upon it 
or across it. . ." Id If "the invasion is intentional, liability depends on whether the 
invasion is unreasonable." Id. 
As discussed above, the evidence adduced at trial showed that Plaintiffs' actions 
altered the surface water flow to such an extent that it damaged—flooded, inundated, 
swamped—Mr. Howard's property, turning a significant portion into a dangerous fen. 
Sadly, the evidence also shows that Plaintiffs' actions were undertaken either 
intentionally or knowingly, or in reckless disregard for Mr. Howard's property rights. 
Given that the action was illegal and done without respect for Mr. Howard's rights, it was 
unreasonable. 
IV. CONCLUSION. 
In the world proposed by Plaintiffs, we must disavow Utah's carefully crafted and 
well-reasoned water law in favor of a capricious regime under which those who have 
suffered no wrongs—indeed, those who are themselves acting wrongfully—may compel 
those who have not harmed them to submit to their enormities under the pretence of 
protecting a "method of appropriation" which is itself illegal. 
Utah law, however, denies any standing to those who have suffered no harm, and 
Utah water law particularly notes that those who are receiving the water to which their 
water right entitles them cannot complain about (to say nothing of enjoining) anyone 
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else's use of the stream. Now, were Plaintiffs to point to some diminution in the quantity 
of their water, or some pej oration of its quality, and demonstrate that the Howard dike 
was the source of the loss, then they might have a legally cognizable claim. Such is not 
the case however. Plaintiffs freely admit that they misappropriate far more than the 75 
acre-feet to which their certificate of appropriation entitles them, at 20 times the rate it 
permits, to water at least 2V2 times the acreage it allows. They, however, hale Lee 
Howard into court to answer for their having placed a dike in the slough (a dike the Army 
Corps of Engineers approved with the acquiescence of the state engineer), which does not 
interfere with their water right in the slightest, on the grounds that it disturbs the bloated 
and illegal overuse to which they have become accustomed. 
Even if the Lee Howard dike did somehow affect Plaintiffs water right, 
however—which it does not: it would first have to drain away thousands of gallons of 
additional, illegally seized water before even reaching the water permitted by the actual 
right—a burglar should hardly be able to demand police assistance to force a victim's 
door because he has had the impertinence to lock it. And more alarming still, in this case, 
the police officer should not have agreed to assist him. 
In light of these points, as set forth at length in the foregoing brief, Lee Howard 
respectfully requests this Court, first, to reverse the trial court's Order denying the 
Howards' motions for summary judgment and to order the trial court to enter judgment in 
favor of Lee Howard on Plaintiffs' interference claims; second, in the alternative, to 
vacate the trial court's Final Judgment as to Plaintiffs' interference claims; third, to order 
the tnal court to enter judgment in favor of Lee Howard as to his trespass, nuisance, and 
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exigence counterclaims, and to enjoin Plaintiffs' acting outside the bounds of their 
certificate of appropriation; and fourth, to remand this matter to the trial court for a 
determination of punitive damages and attorney's fees. 
Dated this S^day of January, 2006. 
lig Smith 
[D. Scott Crook 
Scott M. Ellsworth 
SMITH HARTVIGSEN, PLLC 
Attorneys for Appellant Lee Howard 
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On this __5__"day of January, 2006, two true and correct copies of the foregoing 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF was sent through the United States mail, first-class, postage 
prepaid, addressed as follows: 
John H. Mabey, Jr. 
David C. Wright 
MABEY & WRIGHT 
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ADDENDUM 
STATUTES CITED IN THE BRIEF BUT NOT REPRODUCED VERBATIM THEREIN. 
TRIAL EXHIBIT NO. 1, CERTIFICATE OF APPROPRIATION, MARY E. 
MARRIOTT, MARCH 8,1913. 
TRIAL EXHIBIT No. 101, MAP OF THE MARRIOTT SLOUGH SYSTEM. 
THE STATE ENGINEER'S MEMORANDUM DECISION, FEBRUARY 26,1999. 
PLAINTIFFS' REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION, FILED WITH THE STATE 
ENGINEER, MARCH 17,1999. 
DECISION OF JULY 9,2002, DENYING DEFENDANTS ' MOTION FOR PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
MINUTE ENTRY OF OCTOBER 29,2003, DENYING DEFENDANT' S MOTION FOR 
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
ORDER DATED NOVEMBER 20,2003. 
TRIAL COURT DECISION OF APRIL 27,2004. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, FILED MAY 12,2005. 
FINAL JUDGMENT, ENTERED MAY 12,2005. 
TRIAL COURT DECISION, AUGUST 23,2004. 
SEARLE V. MILBURNIRRIGATION CO., 2005 UT 58,533 UTAH ADV. REP. 49. 
Tab A 
TabB 
TabC 
TabD 
TabE 
TabF 
Tab G 
TabH 
Tab I 
Tab J 
TabK 
TabL 
Tab M 
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A o 73-3-1. APPROPRIATION — MANNER OF ACQUIRING WATER RIGHTS. 
Rights to the use of the unappropriated public waters in this state may be acquired 
lv as provided in this title. No appropriation of water may be made and no rights to the 
°
n
 thereof initiated and no notice of intent to appropriate shall be recognized except 
USnlication for such appropriation first be made to the state engineer in the manner 
h einafter provided, and not otherwise. The appropriation must be for some useful and 
beneficial purpose, and, as between appropriators, the one first in time shall be first in 
rights; provided, that when a use designated by an application to appropriate any of the 
"appropriated waters of the state would materially interfere with a more beneficial use 
of such water, the application shall be dealt with as provided in Section 73-3-8. No right 
to the use of water either appropriated or unappropriated can be acquired by adverse use 
or adverse possession. 
n r A s 73-3-2. APPLICATION FOR RIGHT TO USE UNAPPROPRIATED PUBLIC WATER 
NECESSITY — FORM — CONTENTS — VALIDATION OF PRIOR 
APPLICATIONS BY STATE OR UNITED STATES OR OFFICER OR AGENCY 
THEREOF. 
(1) (a) In order to acquire the right to use any unappropriated public water in this 
state, any person who is a citizen of the United States, or who has filed his 
declaration of intention to become a citizen as required by the naturalization 
laws, or any association of citizens or declarants, or any corporation, or the 
state of Utah by the directors of the divisions of travel development, 
business and economic development, wildlife resources, and state lands and 
forestry, or the executive director of the Department of Transportation for 
the use and benefit of the public, or the United States of America shall 
make an application in a form prescribed by the state engineer before 
commencing the construction, enlargement, extension, or structural 
alteration of any ditch, canal, well, tunnel, or other distributing works, or 
performing similar work tending to acquire such rights or appropriation, or 
enlargement of an existing right or appropriation. 
(b) The application shall be upon a form to be furnished by the state engineer 
and shall set forth: 
(i) the name and post office address of the person, corporation, or 
association making the application; 
00 the nature of the proposed use for which the appropriation is 
intended; 
On) the quantity of water in acre-feet or the flow of water in second-feet 
to be appropriated; 
s time during which it is to be used each year; 
r-'her source from which the water is to t 
.lie nana • 
Averted' 
r^te •^  the place on the stream or source where the water is to be « 
and the nature of the diverting works; 
,c dimensions, grade, shape, and nature of the proposed d^erm 
channel: and 
_ ^ , j r w c t s Ulu • - e the full purpose of the propos< 
appropriation. 
addition to the information required in buoscc-.. " " "'Sl 
use is for irrigation, the application shall show: 
m the legal subdivisions of the land proposed to be irrigated, with t 
total acreage thereof; and 
/jj) the character of the soil. 
T addition to the information required in Subsection (l)(b), if the propos 
uSe is for developing power, the application shall show: 
n the number, size, and kind of water wheels to be employed and i 
head under which each wheel is to be operated; 
the amount of power to PC PKKUU. *•:•„ 
r-.irroses for which and the places where it is to be used; and 
ie point where the water is to be returned to the natural stream 
(H) 
11 
source. 
• Edition to the information required in Subsection (l)(b), if the propo 
,,^ is for milling or mining, the application shall show: 
m , M name of the mill and its location or the name of the mine and 
W
 mining district in which it is situated; 
(jj) its nature; and 
(iii) the place where the water is to be returned to the natural strear 
source. 
....:•• -v ' - h i t of return of the water shal 
designated with reference to the United States land survey corners, 
mineral monuments or permanent federal triangulation or traverse 
monuments, when either the point of diversion or the point of return 
is situated within six miles of the corners and monuments. 
(ii) If the point of diversion or point of return is located in unsurveyed 
territory, the point may be designated with reference to a permanent, 
prominent natural object. 
(iii) The storage of water by means of a reservoir shall be regarded as a 
diversion, and the point of diversion in those cases is the point where 
the longitudinal axis of the dam crosses the center of the stream bed. 
(iv) The point where released storage water is taken from the stream 
shall be designated as the point of rediversion. 
(v) The lands to be inundated by any reservoir shall be described as 
nearly as may be, and by government subdivision if upon surveyed 
land. The height of the dam, the capacity of the reservoir, and the 
area of the surface when the reservoir is filled shall be given. 
(vi) If the water is to be stored in an underground area or basin, the 
applicant shall designate, with reference to the nearest United States 
land survey corner if situated within six miles of it, the point of area 
of intake, the location of the underground area or basin, and the 
points of collection. 
(e) Applications for the appropriation of water filed prior to the enactment of 
this title, by the United States of America, or any officer or agency of it, or 
the state of Utah, or any officer or agency of it, are validated, subject to any 
action by the state engineer. 
UCA § 73-3-3—PERMANENT OR TEMPORARY CHANGES IN POINT OF DIVERSION, 
PLACE OF USE, OR PURPOSE OF USE. 
(1) For purposes of this section: 
(a) "Permanent changes" means changes for an indefinite length of time with 
an intent to relinquish the original point of diversion, place of use, or 
purpose of use. 
) "Temporary changes" means changes for fixed periods not exceeding one 
year. 
(2) fa\ A 
ny person entitled to the use of water may make permanent or temporary 
changes in the: 
(i) point of diversion; 
(ii) place of use; or 
(iii) purpose of use for which the water was originally appropriated. 
(b) A change may not be made if it impairs any vested right without 
compensation. 
(3) Both permanent and temporary changes of point of diversion, place of use 
purpose of use of water, including water involved in general adjudication or o 
suits, shall be made in the manner provided in this section. 
(4) (a) A change may not be made unless the change application is approve< 
the state engineer. 
(b) Applications shall be made upon forms furnished by the state engineer 
shall set forth: 
(i) the name of the applicant; 
(ii) a description of the water right; 
(iii) the quantity of water; 
(iv) the stream or source; 
(v) the point on the stream or source where the water is diverted; 
(vi) the point to which it is proposed to change the diversion ( 
water; 
(vii) the place, purpose, and extent of the present use; 
(viii) the place, purpose, and extent of the proposed use; and 
(ix) any other information that the state engineer requires. 
(5) (a) The state engineer shall follow the same procedures, and the righ 
duties of the applicants with respect to applications for permanent cl 
of point of diversion, place of use, or purpose of use shall be the sa 
provided in this title for applications to appropriate water. 
(b) The state engineer may, in connection with applications for pen 
change involving only a change in point of diversion of 660 feet < 
waive the necessity for publishing a notice of application. 
(6) (a) The state engineer shall investigate all temporary change applications. 
(b) If the state engineer finds that the temporary change will not impair any 
vested rights of others, he shall issue an order authorizing the change. 
(c) If the state engineer finds that the change sought might impair vested rights, 
before authorizing the change, he shall give notice of the application to any 
person whose rights may be affected by the change. 
(d) Before making an investigation or giving notice, the state engineer may 
require the applicant to deposit a sum of money sufficient to pay the 
expenses of the investigation and publication of notice. 
(7) (a) The state engineer may not reject applications for either permanent or 
temporary changes for the sole reason that the change would impair the 
vested rights of others. 
(b) If otherwise proper, permanent or temporary changes may be approved for 
part of the water involved or upon the condition that conflicting rights are 
acquired. 
(8) (a) Any person holding an approved application for the appropriation of water 
may either permanently or temporarily change the point of diversion, place 
of use, or purpose of use. 
(b) A change of an approved application does not: 
(i) affect the priority of the original application; or 
(ii) extend the time period within which the construction of work is to 
begin or be completed. 
(9) Any person who changes or who attempts to change a point of diversion, place of 
use, or purpose of use, either permanently or temporarily, without first applying to 
the state engineer in the manner provided in this section: 
(a) obtains no right; 
(b) is guilty of a crime punishable under Section 73-2-27 if the change or 
attempted change is made knowingly or intentionally; and 
(c) is guilty of a separately punishable offense for each day of the unlawful 
change. 
(10) ( a \ -pi . 
ins section does not apply to the replacement of an existing well by a new 
well drilled within a radius of 150 feet from the point of diversion of the 
existing well. 
(b) Any replacement well must be drilled in accordance with the requireme 
of Section 73-3-28. 
(a) In accordance with the requirements of this section, the Division 
Wildlife Resources or Division of Parks and Recreation may 
applications for permanent or temporary changes for the purpose 
providing water for instream flows, within a designated section of a nati 
stream channel or altered natural stream channel, necessary within the s 
for: 
(i) the propagation of fish; 
(ii) public recreation; or 
(iii) the reasonable preservation or enhancement of the natural str 
environment. 
(b) Applications may be filed for changes on: 
(i) perfected water rights presently owned by the respective divisior 
(ii) perfected water rights purchased by the respective division fo 
purpose of providing water for instream flows, through fur 
provided for that purpose by legislative appropriation or acquire 
lease, agreement, gift, exchange, or contribution; or 
(iii) appurtenant water rights acquired with the acquisition of 
property by either division. 
(c) A physical structure or physical diversion from the stream is not requi 
implement a change for instream flow use. 
(d) This Subsection (11) does not allow enlargement of the water right s 
to be changed nor may the change impair any vested water right. 
(e) In addition to the other requirements of this section, an application fi 
either division shall: 
(i) set forth the legal description of the points on the stream b( 
which the necessary instream flows will be provided by the c 
and 
(ii) include appropriate studies, reports, or other information requ 
the state engineer that demonstrate the necessity for the ir 
flows in the specified section of the stream and the projected t 
to the public that will result from the change. 
(f) The Division of Wildlife Resources and Division of Parks and Recreation 
may: 
(i) purchase water rights for the purposes provided in Subsection 
(ll)(a) only with funds specifically appropriated by the Legislature 
for water rights purchases; or 
(ii) accept a donated water right without legislative approval. 
(g) This Subsection (11) does not authorize either division to: 
(i) appropriate unappropriated water under Section 73-3-2 for the 
purpose of providing instream flows; or 
(ii) acquire water rights by eminent domain for instream flows or for any 
other purpose. 
(h) This Subsection (11) applies only to change applications filed on or after 
April 28, 1986. 
(a) Sixty days before the date on which proof of change for instream flows 
under Subsection (11) is due, the state engineer shall notify the applicant by 
registered mail or by any form of electronic communication through which 
receipt is verifiable of the date when proof of change is due. 
(b) Before the date when proof of change is due, the applicant must either: 
(i) file a verified statement with the state engineer that the instream 
flow uses have been perfected, which shall set forth: 
(A) the legal description of the points on the natural stream 
channel or altered natural stream channel between which the 
necessary instream flows have been provided; 
(B) detailed measurements of the flow of water m second feet 
changed; 
(C) the period of use; and 
(D) any additional information required by the state engineer; or 
(c) 
(ii) apply for a further extension of time as provided for in Section 73-3-
12. 
Upon approval of the verified statement required under Subsection 
(12)(b)(i), the state engineer shall issue a certificate of change for instream 
flow use. 
UCA § 73-3-10 APPROVAL OR REJECTION OF APPLICATION. 
(1) When the approval or rejection of an application is decided, a record of the 
decision shall be made in the state engineer's office. 
(2) The state engineer's decision shall be mailed to the applicant. 
(3) If the application is approved, the applicant shall be authorized upon receipt of the 
decision to: 
(a) proceed with the construction of the necessary works; 
(b) take any steps required to apply the water to the use named in the 
application; and 
(c) perfect the proposed application. 
(4) If the application is rejected, the applicant shall take no steps toward the 
prosecution of the proposed work or the diversion and use of the public water 
under the application. 
(5) The state engineer shall state in any decision approving an application the time 
within which the construction work must be completed and the water applied to 
beneficial use. 
UCA § 73-3-11. STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ABILITY OF APPLICANTS. 
Before either approving or rejecting an application the state engineer may require 
such additional information as will enable him properly to guard the public interests, and 
may require a statement of the following facts: In case of an incorporated company, he 
may require the submission of the articles of incorporation, the names and places of 
residence of its directors and officers, and the amount of its authorized and its paid-up 
capital. If the applicant is not a corporation, he may require a showing as to the names of 
the persons proposing to make the appropriation and a showing of facts necessary to 
enable him to determine whether or not they are qualified appropriators and have the 
financial ability to carry out the proposed work, and whether or not the application has 
been made in good faith. 
UCA §73-3-12. TIME LIMIT ON CONSTRUCTION AND APPLICATION TO BENEFICIAL 
USE — EXTENSIONS — PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA. 
(1) As used in this section, "public agency" means a public water supply agency of: 
(a) the state; or 
(b) a political subdivision of the state. 
(a) The construction of the works and the application of water to beneficial use 
shall be diligently prosecuted to completion within the time fixed by the 
state engineer. 
(b) Extensions of time, not exceeding 50 years from the date of approval of the 
application, except as provided in Subsection (2)(c), may be granted by the 
state engineer on proper showing of diligence or reasonable cause for delay. 
(c) Additional extensions of time, beyond 50 years, may be granted by the state 
engineer on applications held by any public agency, if the public agency 
can demonstrate the water will be needed to meet the reasonable future 
requirements of the public. 
(d) All requests for extension of time shall be made by signed statement and 
shall be filed in the office of the state engineer on or before the date fixed 
for filing proof of appropriation. 
(e) Extensions not exceeding 14 years after the date of approval may be 
granted by the state engineer upon a sufficient showing by signed 
statement, but extensions beyond 14 years shall be granted only after 
application and publication of notice. 
(f) (i) The state engineer shall publish a notice of the application once a 
week for two successive weeks, in a newspaper of general 
circulation, in the county in which the source of the water supply is 
located and where the water is to be used. 
(ii) The notice shall: 
(A) state that an application has been made; and 
(B) specify where the interested party may obtain additional 
information relating to the application. 
(g) Any person who owns a water right from the source of supply referred to in 
Subsection (2)(f) or holds an application from that source of supply may 
file a protest with the state engineer: 
(i) within 20 days after the notice is published, if the adjudicative 
proceeding is informal; and 
00 within 30 days after the notice is published, if the adjudicative 
proceeding is formal. 
(h) In considering an application to extend the time in which to place water t 
beneficial use under an approved application, the state engineer shall den 
the extension and declare the application lapsed, unless the applicai 
affirmatively shows that the applicant has exercised or is exercisin 
reasonable and due diligence in working toward completion of tl 
appropriation. 
(i) (i) If reasonable and due diligence is shown by the applicant, the sta 
engineer shall approve the extension. 
(ii) The approved extension is effective so long as the applica 
continues to exercise reasonable diligence in completing ti 
appropriation. 
(j) The state engineer shall consider the holding of an approved application ' 
any public agency to meet the reasonable future requirements of the pub 
to be reasonable and due diligence within the meaning of this section j 
the first 50 years. The state engineer may approve extensions beyond 
years for a public agency, if the agency provides information sufficient 
demonstrate the water will be needed to meet the reasonable futi 
requirements of the public. 
(k) If the state engineer finds unjustified delay or lack of diligence 
prosecuting the works to completion, the state engineer may deny 
extension or may grant the request in part or upon conditions, includin, 
reduction of the priority of all or part of the application. 
(3) (a) Except as provided in Subsections (3)(b) and (c), an application upon wh 
proof has not been submitted shall lapse and have no further force or efi 
after the expiration of 50 years from the date of its approval. 
(b) If the works are constructed with which to make beneficial use of the w< 
applied for, the state engineer may, upon showing of that fact, g\ 
additional time beyond the 50-year period in which to make proof. 
(c) An application held by a public agency to meet the reasonable fu 
requirements of the public, for which proof of appropriation has not t 
submitted, shall lapse, unless extended as provided in Subsection (2)(j). 
UCA $ 73-3-16. PROOF OF APPROPRIATION OR PERMANENT CHANGE — NOTICI 
MANNER OF PROOF — STATEMENTS — MAPS, PROFILES, , 
DRAWINGS — VERIFICATION — WAIVER OF FILING — STATEM 
IN LIEU OF PROOF OF APPROPRIATION OR CHANGE. 
(1) Sixty days before the date set for the proof of appropriation or proof of chanj 
be made the state engineer shall notify the applicant by mail when proof of 
completion of the works and application of the water to a beneficial use will be 
due. 
On or before the date set for completing the proof in accordance with the 
application, the applicant shall file proof with the state engineer on forms 
furnished by the state engineer. 
Except as provided in Subsection (4), the applicant shall submit the following 
information: 
••) the quantity o\ water in acre-feet or the flow" in second-feet diverted, or 
both; 
i'c) the method of applying the water to beneficial use; and 
(i) detailed measurements of water put to beneficial use; 
(ii) the date the measurements were made; and 
(i?i) the name of the person making the measurements. 
•Jn applications filed for appropriation or permanent change of use of water 
to provide a water supply for state projects constructed pursuant to Title 73, 
Chapter 10. Board of Water Resources - Division of Water R esources, or 
for federal projects constructed by the United States Bureau of Reclamation 
for the use and benefit of the state, any of its agencies, its political 
subdivisions, public and quasi-municipal corporations, or water users' 
associations of which the state, its agencies, political subdivisions, or public 
md quasi-municipal corporations are stockholders, the proof shall include: 
i) a statement: indicating constr uction of tl le pi eject ^ v or] :s 1 las been 
completed; 
a description of the major features with appropriate maps, profiles, 
drawings, and reservoir area-capacity curves; 
a description of the point or points of diversion and rediversion; 
:>roieei operation data; 
(v) a map showing the place of use of water and a statement of the 
purpose and method of use: 
the project 
v.tuons 
and the quantity of water required; and 
(vii) a statement indicating what type of measuring devices have bee 
installed. 
(b) The director of the Division of Water Resources shall sign proofs for tl 
state projects and an authorized official of the Bureau of Reclamation she 
sign proofs for the federal projects specified in Subsection (4)(a). 
(5) The proof on all applications shall be sworn to by the applicant or the applican 
appointed representative and proof engineer. 
(6) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (6)(b), when filing proof, the applica 
shall submit maps, profiles, and drawings made by a Utah licensed la 
surveyor or Utah licensed professional engineer that show: 
(i) the location of the completed works; 
(ii) the nature and extent of the completed works; 
(iii) the natural stream or source from which and the point where i 
water is diverted and, in the case of a nonconsumptive use, the po 
where the water is returned; and 
(iv) the place of use. 
(b) The state engineer may waive the filing of maps, profiles, and drawing 
in the state engineer's opinion the written proof adequately describes 
works and the nature and extent of beneficial use. 
(7) The completed proof shall conform to rules and standards established by the s 
engineer. 
(8) In those areas in which general determination proceedings are pending, or h 
been concluded, under Title 73, Chapter 4, Determination of Water Rights, 
state engineer may petition the district court for permission to: 
(a) waive the requirements of this section and Section 73-3-17; and 
(b) permit each owner of an application to file a verified statement to the ei 
that the applicant has completed the appropriation or change and elecl 
file a statement of water users claim in the proposed determination of w 
rights or any supplement to it in accordance with Title 73, Chapte 
Determination of Water Rights, in lieu of proof of appropriation or proc 
change. 
UCA § 73-3-17. CERTIFICATE OF APPROPRIATION — EVIDENCE. 
Upon it being made to appear to the satisfaction of the state engineer that an 
appropriation or a permanent change of point of diversion, place or nature of use has been 
perfected in accordance with the application therefor, and that the water appropriated or 
affected by the change has been put to a beneficial use, as required by Section 73-3-16, 
he shall issue a certificate, in duplicate, setting forth the name and post-office address of 
the person by whom the water is used, the quantity of water in acre-feet or the flow in 
second-feet appropriated, the purpose for which the water is used, the time during which 
the water is to be used each year, the name of the stream or source of supply from which 
the water is diverted, the date of the appropriation or change, and such other matter as 
will fully and completely define the extent and conditions of actual application of the 
water to a beneficial use; provided that certificates issued on applications for projects 
constructed pursuant to Title 73, Chapter 10, Utah Code Annotated 1953, and for the 
federal projects constructed by the United States Bureau of Reclamation, referred to in 
Section 73-3-16 of said Code, need show no more than the facts shown in the proof. The 
certificate shall not extend the rights described in the application. Failure to file proof of 
appropriation or proof of change of the water on or before the date set therefor shall cause 
the application to lapse. One copy of such certificate shall be filed in the office of the 
state engineer and the other shall be delivered to the appropriator or to the person making 
the change who shall, within thirty days, cause the same to be recorded in the office of 
the county recorder of the county in which the water is diverted from the natural stream 
or source. The certificate so issued and filed shall be prima facie evidence of the owner's 
right to the use of the water in the quantity, for the purpose, at the place, and during the 
time specified therein, subject to prior rights. 
UCA § 73-3-20. RIGHT TO DIVERT APPROPRIATED WATERS INTO NATURAL STREAMS 
— REQUIREMENTS — STORAGE IN RESERVOIR — INFORMATION 
REQUIRED BY STATE ENGINEER — LAPSE OF APPLICATION. 
(1) Upon application in writing and approval of the state engineer, any appropriated 
water may, for the purpose of preventing waste and facilitating distribution, be 
turned from the channel of any stream or any lake or other body of water, into the 
channel of any natural stream or natural body of water or into a reservoir 
constructed across the bed of any natural stream, and commingled with its waters, 
and a like quantity less the quantity lost by evaporation and seepage may be taken 
out, either above or below the point where emptied into the stream, body of water 
or reservoir. In so doing, the original water in such stream, body of water, or 
reservoir must not be deteriorated in quality or diminished in quantity for the 
purpose used, and the additional water turned in shall bear its share of the expense 
of maintenance of such reservoir and an equitable proportion of the cost of the 
leservoir site and its construction. Any person having stored his appropriated 
water m a reservoir for a beneficial purpose shall be permitted to withdraw the 
a
 er at the times and in the quantities as his necessities may require if the 
withdrawal does not interfere with the rights of others. 
(2) The state engineer may require the owner of record of an approved excha 
application to provide information concerning the diverting works constructed, 
extent to which the development under the exchange has occurred, and o 
information the state engineer considers necessary to insure the exchange is tal 
place, to establish the owner of the exchange still has a legal interest in 
underlying water right used as the basis for the exchange, or to arrive at 
quantity of water being exchanged. This information shall be provided by 
owner of record of an approved exchange within 60 days of notification b> 
state engineer. 
(3) The state engineer may lapse an application made pursuant to this section u 
the following conditions: 
(a) the applicant has lost a legal interest in the underlying right use 
facilitate the exchange; 
(b) the exchange can no longer be carried out as stated in the application; 
(c) the applicant has not complied with the conditions established in appr 
the exchange; or 
(d) the applicant fails to provide the information as outlined in Subsectic 
3-20(2). 
OQ 
r (DUPLICATE) 
GERTIMCATE OI? APPROPRIATION OF WAT1B 
APPLICATION N0...5QSfii STATE OF UTAH 
J ^ J L B . . ? . . ? ! -?-•L.Y—JL-ll WATER DIVISION 
CERTIFICATE N0.„.?.§J?J 
TKBbereas, T£ 7z,as been made to appear to the satisfaction of the undersigned, State Engineer of the State of Utah, that the appropriation of 
water from-.,. * . 8 „ . L . ? . . 0 . . £ -in ? . . .? . .^ .? . . f Countyf made by M§ffX.. .JL s . . . . lCarriott^ has 
been perfected in accordance with tha application therefor, received in the office of the State Engineer on the...3.^ day of M&ZSlhj 19-£$ 
and recorded on page.„.£*Jr~4&4„.in book JLrA5
 (;/ the record of applications to appropriate water; TKflberefore, Be it known that 
I, j?_i.. JQi-.-.B.A.Q.X.-S , State Engineer of the State of Utah, under and by authority and direction of the provisions of the 
Compiled Laws of Utah, 1907, as amended by Chapter (JiB of the Session Laws of Utah, 1909, a.nd. Chapters. 3 and 103 of the Session Laws ofUtahy 
1911, on " Water Rights and Irrigation/' do hereby certify that the su,id _JkLA.X.X-.,-Ji* J t .A.X-Jr„I . .Q . . t . - i , of 
d e n , 
-in ; V *.*..£.* County, State of I l . . t -&. .k . 
, **. 
entitled to the use of f iY.e-.y6.at-h.J3ij.5,l_.of...Qije cubic feet of water per second., subject to the following restrictioiis, to-wit: 
1 
The w a t e r i s d i v e r t e d a t a p o i n t whi ch l i e s 1 2 9 9 f x . s o u t h and 1 5 9 5 f t . v /as t f rom t h e n o r t h e a s t c o r n e r o f S e c t i o n 
1 3 , Townsh ip . 6 tforth,Range 3 W e s t , S a l t L a k e b a s e and m e r i d i a n . The w a t e r i s d i v e r t e d "by means of a pump and conveyed 
i n a d i t c h , 1550 f t . l o n g , 2 f t . w i d e on t o p and 1 , 5 fx , w ide i n t h e b o t t o m , h a v i n g an e f f e c t i v e d e p t h "off 1 f t . 
The w a t e r i s u s e d f rom May 1 t o S e p t e m b e r 3,Q, i n c l u s i v e , of e a c h y e a r , t o i r r i g a t e t w e n t y - f i v e ( 2 £ J a c r e s of l a n d 
e m b r a c e d i n t h e n o r t h h a l f of t h e n o r t h e a s t q u a r t e r (E-J- E B | ) of S e c t i o n 1 3 , T o w n s h i p S~t tor tH, E&nge 3 W e s t , S a l t Lake 
b a s e and m e r i d i a n , p a r t i c u l a r l y d e s c r i b e d a s f o l l o w s : B e g i n n i n g a t a p o i n t 33 f t , w e s t and 7 4 2 . 5 f t . s o u t h f rom t h e 
n o r t h e a s t c o r n e r of s a i d S e c t i o n 1 3 , r u n n i n g t h e n c e s o u t h 5 7 7 . 5 f t . . , t h e n c e w u s t 1550 f t . , t h e n c e n o r t h 8 2 5 ' f t i t h e n c e 
e a s t 500 f t . , t h e n c e s o u t h 76°44» e a s t 1079 f t . t o p l a c e of b e g i n n i n g . • ' 
T h i s c e r t i f i c a t e e n t i t l e ^ t h e h o l d e r t o u s e f i v e - t e n t h s of a c u b i c f o o t cf w a t e r p e r s e c o n d i n t o r m i t t e n t l y f o r xhs 
l a n d a r e a d e s c r i b e d ; b u t , t h e s a i d h o l d e r i s n o t e n t i t l e d by v i r t u e of t h i s c e r t i f i c a t e t o u s e t o dxceed t h e e q u i v a l e n t 
of t h r e e , a c r e - f e e t of w a t e r p e r a c r e of l a n d i r r i g a t e d p a r annum. 
The d i v e r t i n g works m u s t be m a i n t a i n e d i n s u c h c o n d i t i o n a e w i l l p r e v e n t an u n r e a s o n a b l e l o s e of w a t e r . 
1 3 . The (late of the appropriation is -M. a~?-- ?---! *~* -1'1- , 
In TRftU'ncBB TObcvcot, I have Kerei+nt.o,wtvi,yh^^ 
KNIGHT'S PUMP, 
V/ WEST WARREN DI 
SEPARATION TIN r^-A ) v rn 
\ \ 
\ ) 
J 
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MEMORANDUM DECISION 
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 i n520 (A71312), in the names of Glynn Wayment and Edward 
Number J b " r L m b e r 30, 1997, to appropriate 260.0 acre-feet of water 
f i l ed on uf^ted south 1299 feet and West 1595 feet from the NE 
t SToU?5•
 TfiM R3W SLB&M, to be used for supplemental i r r igat ion 
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§ ^ % Howard and 
Utah. 
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exp laineu LI c o l l e c t s 1n t h e Marriott Slough. 
35-8073 which allows ii 
Existing water rights 
i t is . the 
sf: 
the protests, water right records, and hydro"!ogi'c 
opinion of the State Engineer that suff icient 
• this application is not available. After water 
Jf-Water to o d ^ ^ h ^o r L i t t l e Weber Creek), i t looses i t s unique 
li?e M a K mav have been appropriated and used by the applicant and jgter wnicrUIWJ
 f o p o t h e p n g h t s o n t h e M a r r i o t t slough. 
pre, 
ORDERED and Application Number 35-10520 (A71312) is hereby 
H i c ihiPft to the provisions of Rule R655-6-1/ 
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 Inneal with the appropriate Distr ict Court. 
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i s considered denied when no action is taken 20 days after the 
Say of February, 1999. 
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:--^ couth Main Street, Suite 1300 
• c I t Lake City, Utah 84111-2208 " " S & g f f " * 
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attorneys for Applicants 
BEFORE THE STATE ENGINEER, DIVISION OF WATER RIGHTS 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES 
Hi "RE' 
fppLlCATlON TO APPROPRIATE 
K'1312 (35-10520) 
REQUEST FOR 
RECONSIDERATION 
Appropriation applicants Glynn Wayment and Edward England (collectively 
replicants"), by and through their counsel, Steven E. Clyde and Reagan L. Brenneman of Clyde 
gftw Sessions & Swenson, do hereby respectfully submit this Request for Reconsideration of 
late Engineer Memorandum Decision dated February 26, 1999. This request is authorized 
ffider Sections 73-3-14 and 63-46b-13 of the Utah Code Annotated, and Rule 655-6-17 of the 
iAdministrative Code. 
INTRODUCTION 
P P On December 30, 1997, Applicants Glynn Wayment and Edward England filed to 
BB&priate 260 acre feet of water, pumped at a 10 c.f.s. maximum intermittent flow rate, from 
Slough for irrigation of 90 acres and sole supply of 65 acres. Applicants proposed to 
is water by means of a pump flume and waste water collection ditch.. 
1 
Protestants to this application included Lonn Knight, Paul H. Knight, Michael P. Quayle, 
Larry Wade, Alma Knight, Richard A. Knight, G. Guy Jones, Kathleen J. Hansen, Richard F. 
Hansen, the Knight Irrigation Company, and Lee, Roger and William Howard.1 Essentially, 
these parties argued that there is no unappropriated water in the source, the proposed use would 
impair existing rights, and the application would unreasonably affect public recreation and the 
natural stream environment. 
On January 21, 1999, a hearing was held on this mattei On February 26, 1999, the State 
Engineer issued its decision denying the application based on its opinion that there is not 
sufficient unappropnated water in the source to satisfy the application. The State Jbngineer also 
stated m the Memorandum Decision that "[ajfter water collects in Marriott Slough (or Little 
Webei Creek), it luses its umque identity as watci which may have been appropriated and used 
by the applicant and becomes the source of supply for other rights on the Marriott Slough." 
Memorandum Decision, February 26, 1999. 
Essentially, that water which applicants seek to appropriate is imported, or foreign, wat 
from the Weber River which would not have found its way to the Marriott Slough but foi 
irrigation practices on applicants' lands and lands neighboring applicants' lands The slough 
separate and. distinct drainage; importantly, the Weber River, the source of origin, is not tnbu 
to the slough. Therefore, the water applicants seek to appropriate is that which runs off 
applicants' other lands and is collected in the slough and is not naturally in the system. 
Accordingly, protestants have no call on that water. 
!Basin Land & Livestock also filed a late protest, submitted just days before the he* 
Applicants continue to assert that this late protest should not be considered by the State En 
in issuing its decision in this matter. 
2 
In fact, the situation is analogous to'that in Steed v. New Escalante Irrigation Co., 846 
p.2d 1223 (Utah 1992), wherein the irrigation company diverted from the Escalante River and 
Steed diverted from Alvey Wash. The Utah Supreme Court held that the Escalante River was 
not naturally tributary to Alvey Wash, and therefore any irrigation seepage and waste water 
reaching the Wash was not return flow water but only waste or foreign waters and that Steed, as 
the downstream appropriator did not have a vested right as against the upstream irrigators to 
force them to continue wasting water for Steed's benefit. Thus, where the Application to 
Appropriate meets the requirements of the Water Code, Title 73 of the Utah Code Ann. 
("U.C.A."), and approval of the application would be consistent under Steed, Applicant submits 
this Request for Reconsideration asking the State Engineer to approve this application. 
REASONS FOR APPROVAL 
I. Under Steed, This Application Shouid Be Approved Where Applicants Seek 
to Appropriate Waste and Seepage Water, Used on Their and Neighboring 
Lands, Imported from the Original Source of the Weber River, Which Is 
Non-tributary to the Marriott Slough, and To Which Protestants Have No 
Call 
Applicants seek to appropriate waste or seepage water, originally diverted from the 
Weber River, and which has found its way into Marriott Slough. This water is foreign water in 
the slough and is subject to appropriation and use by application. Specifically, the water at issue 
constitutes seepage or waste water that drains from irrigation practices on Applicants' land and 
•neighboring lands into Marriott Slough. Because the Weber River is not naturally tributary to 
Marriott Slough, this water is foreign to the slough and is subject to recapture and reuse by the 
°
nginal appropriator. Under Utah law, these waters are available for appropriation. 
3 
1 
This situation is- analogous with Steed v. New Escalante Irrigation Co., 846 P.2& 1223, 
1227 (Utah 1992) (tracing case law on rights of water users in runoff and seepage waters), and 
thus, this application should be approved. Under Steed, a water user has the right to use his 
water to the fullest extent possible and is allowed to recapture that water while it is on his 
property and before it co-mingles with the source of origin. 846 P.2d at 1226. See also 2 Robert 
E. Beck, et al, Waters and Water Rights § 13.04, at 150, 152-53 (1991). No downstream junior 
appropriator has any vested right to demand or require that the upstream user waste water even to 
maintain historic seepage or run-off flows where the water has not commingled with the source 
of origin. Id. 
Specifically, Steed involved an irrigation company that had historically diverted water 
from ihe Escalante River to its shareholders7 lands through open canals. 846 P.2d at 1224. In 
turn, the shareholders flood-irrigated their lands. Id. Some of this irrigation water drained from 
the shareholders' lands in the form of runoff and seepage water into Alvey Wash, where it 
commingled with the natural flow in the'wash. Id. Importantly, the Escalante River does not 
naturally contribute any water to the Alvey Wash. Id. 
Ultimately. New Escalante changed its irrigation system from flood to sprinkler systems 
In so doing, the efficient new system substantially diminished runoff and seepage flows that 
previously fed into Alvey Wash. Id. 
The estate of Steed owned a decreed water right in Alvey Wash. It argued that it had a 
vested right to receive historicamounts of runoff and seepage flow to the wash. Id. To the 
contrary, however, the trial court found that "because there was no natural contribution of waf 
from the Escalante River to the wash, Steed had acquired no vested right, either by appropriaf 
by adverse use, or otherwise" to compel New Escalante to continue to let historic amounts of 
4 
off or seep from its shareholders' lands into the wash. Id. (as interpreted and 
pater run 01 F 
^presented by appellate court). 
The Utah Supreme Court of Appeals upheld this ruling. In its analysis, it traced the 
eVant case law from Gams v. Rollins, 41 Utah 260, 125 P 867 (1912) (holding upstream 
had absolute right to all waste water she could capture before it ran off her land), 
idowner 
dSlookev v Green, 53 Utah 311,178 P. 586 (1919) (runoff, waste and seepage are not 
nation as against owner of irrigated land who desires to recaptuie and apply it 
s land) and Smithfield West Bench In igation Co v Union Central Life Insurance Co , 105 
fttab 468, 142 P-2d 866 (1943) (holding "if original appropriate!" has a beneficial use for such 
& r s he may again reuse then and no one can acquire a right superior to that of the original 
ltor.") to Lasson v. Seely, 120 Utah 679, 238 P 2d *18 (1951) (holding "plaintiff cannot 
5R>pnat 
lipel defendant or others to waste water nor to foiego a water turn to build up the flow of 
Kwats slough • •") and McNaughton > Eaton. 121 Utah 394. 242 P.2d 570 (1952) (warning 
ggfopnator acquired no rights as against original appropriate* to have waste water continue to 
g&to wash) 846 P.2d at 1224-26 
Although the court noted two exceptions from this cleai string of precedent, the court 
Spat the exceptions did not alter the rule in the given circumstances. For example, m East 
Wnganon Co. v. Deseret Irrigation Co., 2 Utah 2d 170, 271 P.2d 449 (1954), that court 
^dthat the rule of recapture and reuse did not apply when runoff or waste water returned to 
S of origin. [Return flow.] Id. at 1226 (citing East Bench Irrigation Co.). Similarly, in 
£rcanbrack 13 Utah 2d 45, 368 P.2d 461 (1962), that court declined to apply the rule 
feon water that had commingled with water in the natural water table, which caused it to 
5 
lose its identity as irrigation water. Id. Ultimately, the Steed Court found that those two 
scenarios were not present in Alvey Wash. 
Finally, the Steed Court emphasized Utah's strong policy promoting water conservation. 
As an example, the court relied upon Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. v. Moyle, 109 Utah 213, 
174 P.2d 148 (1946). In that case, the court had upheld an irrigation company's right to 
waterproof its ditches to prevent seepage, even though that seepage had historically supported 
foliage along the ditch banks of properties servient to the ditch easement. Id. at 1228 (citing Big 
Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co.). Thus, "in the interest of conservation, an irrigation company 
was allowed to capture its seepage even though the seepage was serving a beneficial use in 
supporting flora along the ditch banks." Id. (citing Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co.). 
The facts in this case are directly analogous to Steed, do not fit the exceptions of East 
Bench Irrigation Co. and Stubbs, and support conservation policy. Consequently, the rule of 
recapture and reuse should apply to this application, and its denial should be reversed. Here, as 
in Steed, applicants seek to capture and reuse irrigation water that has historically been used on 
their land or flowed or seeped onto their land from neighboring lands. The water at issue here 
originates from the Weber River. Applicants propose to collect this water in Marriott Slough, 
also sometimes called the Little Weber River, and use it to irrigate other lands. Importantly, as 
in Steed and like Alvey Wash and the Escalante River, the Weber River is not tributary and does 
not naturally contribute to the Little Weber River, or Marriott Slough. Thus, Applicants seek to 
capture and reuse water imported or foreign water. But for the applicants' and neighbors 
irrigation practices, this water would never reach Marriot Slough. Consequently no downstream 
user has a call on this water. Undisputably, applicants could legally capture and reuse this 
irrigation water on their uplands without an appropriation. Distinctly, however, an 
3 3 | 
appropriation is necessary in this circumstance because the applicants seek to apply the water to 
irrigate new land. 
Just as appropriator Steed could not compel New Escalante to continue to waste water, 
protestants have no vested right to prohibit applicants from recapturing and reusing subject 
water, especially where some protestants do not even assert valid prior appropriative rights.2 
Allowing the water to continue down into the Marriott Slough without being beneficially used by 
applicants is contrary to Utah water conservation policy, and contrary to Utah law. Thus, 
applicants are not precluded, and in fact are entitled, to appropriate this water and beneficially 
use the same. 
II. The Proposed Use Will Not Impair Existing Rights under U.C.A. § 73-3-8 (I) 
(b). 
Certain protestants1 rights will not be impaired by this appropriation because those 
protestants have no vested water right in sub-irrigation waters. Again, an upland user can shut 
off his irrigation so that the water does not drain to sub-irrigated fields, and the lower user would 
Shave no recourse. See Steed, 846 P.2d 1223 and Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch, 174 P.2d 148. 
Where protestants have no vested water rights in maintaining a high water table, this 
application can cause no impairment to protestants. At the hearing on this matter, Protestants 
failed to offer evidence of any impairment, relying instead only on speculative allegations. 
Applicants acknowledge that this appropriation will be conditioned by the no impairment rule 
In Steed, the downstream user even had a decreed water right to the seepage and runoff 
^ Alvey Wash; the court held nevertheless that the user had no call on the Escalante, or original 
source, and could therefore not force the upland user to waste water. 
7 
1&3 
and they maintain that no prior rights will be affected because the water is imported waste water 
and is subject to reuse and reappropriation. 
Moreover, at the hearing, every witness testified that changing land use and irrigation 
practices had reduced water in the slough. Although there may be less water now than 
historically in the slough, the reduction is not a result of applicants5 activities, and applicants 
should not be penalized for the reduction where they have a clear right under Utah law to use the 
water at issue. 
Finally, protestants own expert, Don Harnett, testified that the Weber River is not 
tributary to the Little Weber River, or Marriott Slough. Thus, protestants carmot have a call on 
this water because it has been imported into the system, and applicants therefore have every right 
to appropriate it. 
CONCLUSION 
Again, this application meets the requirements for approval of Applications to 
Appropriate. Therefore, the State Engineer should reconsider and should approve this 
application. 
Finally, applicants incorporate and affirm all arguments asserted in their earlier answer to 
protests and at the hearing on this matter. 
8 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT " 3 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
; Wh 
' *'• h \ - -
GLYNN F. WAYMENT and 
EDWARD C. ENGLAND, 
Plaintiffs, D E C I S I O N 
VS 
WILLIAM HOWARD and 
LEE R. HOWARD, Case: 010903790 
Defendants. Judge: W. Brent West 
Clerk : Pamela Allen 
The Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is denied. The motion is denied 
for several reasons. 
First, there are numerous minor and major disputed issues of material facts. The Court 
does not intend to list or itemize all the disputed facts. In a motion for summary judgment, 
it is not the Court's role to sort through and sift out all the facts that are "thrown at it" to 
determine which facts are disputed and which are not. That role occurs, during a trial, when the 
Court acts as the fact finder. A motion f<?r summary judgment is appropriate in a situation where 
both parties agree on the material relevant facts and the only thing the Court has to do is 
determine the legal significance or consequences of those undisputed facts. Suffice it to say, 
summary judgment is generally not appropriate in a situation where both sides list their own 
'allegedly undisputed facts" and those lists don't coincide. Nor, is summary judgment applicable 
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in situations where the moving party lists undisputed facts and the responding party agrees with 
some or a few of those facts and then submits its own lists of facts, which is then responded to by 
the moving party, who then agrees or disagrees in whole or in part with those new alleged facts. 
Both of these situations occur here. 
Secondly, while the Defendants' accurately analyze the concept of res judicata and its 
components: issves preclusion and collateral estoppel, their application of that analysis to the 
Plaintiffs first and second cause of action .misses the mark. The issues in The Matter of 
Application No 35-10520 (A71312) dealt with Plaintiffs request to appropriate irrigation runoff 
water that was in addition (emphasis added) to the water rights they already own. In their first 
two causes of action, the Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants interfered with their existing water 
rights by unilaterally building a dam and drainage pipes that significantly altered the method by 
which the Plaintiffs have utilized their existing water rights for years. Admittedly, some of the 
administrative law judge's findings may constitute res judicata, but the ultimate finding that the 
Plaintiffs are not entitled to additional water rights does not bar the Plaintiffs claim that the 
Defendants have interfered with their existing water rights. 
Third, there is a dispute on the legal definition of what constitutes the Plaintiffs' water 
rights. Normally, this would be an appropriate issue for a motion for summary judgment, but, in 
this instance, there are insufficient facts for the Court to make this legal determination. The 
Defendants claim that their interference is irrelevant because the Plaintiffs still receive the same 
amount of water that they are entitled to use and thus suffer no damages. On the other hand, 
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Plaintiffs claim that the method of obtaining their water is an integral part of their water right. 
They allege that their water right is premised on the pumping and filling cycle of the slough. 
Finally, the Defendants allege that the Plaintiffs have not suffered any damages from the 
Defendants alleged interference with their water right and, thus, the Plaintiffs5 claim is moot. 
However, the fact that the Plaintiffs have taken steps to mitigate or avoid damages by obtaining 
additional or supplemental water doesn't make their claim disappear or become moot. 
Other issues have been raised in the motion for summary-judgment, but are not addressed 
here. These issues include the historical amounts of water used, the seasonal nature of the water 
in the slough, etc. All these issues are reserved and can be raised again at the time of trial. 
Plaintiffs' counsel will please prepare an Order consistent with this Ruling. 
Dated this 8th day of July, 2002. 
Judge W. Brent West 
Second District Court 
• • • y " v- ft 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Decision to the parties 
follows: 
J. Craig Smith 
D. Scott Crook 
1100 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City Ut 84111 
John H. Mabey 
David C. Wright 
265 East 100 South Suite 300 
Salt Lake City Ut 84111 
Dated this 8th day of July, 2002. 
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SECOND DISTRICT COURT - OGDEN COURT 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GLYNN F WAYMENT Et al, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WILLIAM HOWARD Et al, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
HEARING ON MOTION 
Case No: 010903790 WA 
Judge: W. BRENT WEST 
Date: October 29, 2 003 
Clerk: pama 
PRESENT 
Plaintiff(s): GLYNN F WAYMENT 
EDWARD C ENGLAND 
Defendant(s): WILLIAM HOWARD 
LEE R HOWARD 
Plaintiff's Attorney(s) : JOHN H JR MABEY 
DAVID C WRIGHT 
Defendant's Attorney (s) : D SCOTT CROOK 
J CRAIG SMITH 
Video 
Tape Number: W10-29-03 Tape Count: 3:40 
HEARING 
After hearing from the parties the Court finds that it can not 
resolve this case on a Motion for Summary Judgment and denies the 
Motion. 
Case continued to trial. 
Witness lists to be exchanged by 11-10-03. Attorney Wright to 
prepare an order of todays ruling for the Courts signature. 
? : : 
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John H.Mabey, Jr. -4625 
David C.Wright-5566 
MABEY & WRIGHT, LLC 
265 East 100 South, #300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 359-3663 
Fax: (801) 359-2320 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
GLYNN F. WAYMENT and 
EDWARD C. ENGLAND, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
WILLIAM HOWARD and LEE R. 
HOWARD, 
Defendants. 
ORDER DENYING SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 010903790 
Judee W. Brent West 
Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment was argued on October 29. Plaintiffs 
were represented by David C. Wright and John H. Mabey, Jr. Defendants were represented by J. 
Craig Smith and Scott Crook. Having reviewed the memoranda, affidavits and other papers 
submitted in support of and in opposition to the motion, and considering the arguments of 
counsel, the court concludes that there are disputed factual issues that prevent summary 
judgment. It is therefore 
Ordered that defendant's motion is denied. 
723 
November 2ft ^2003. 
BY THE COURI?\ J J _ L 
W. Brent West 
District Court Judge 
Approved as to form: 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on November ^ , 2003,1 caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, a copy of 
the foregoing Order Denying Summary Judgment to the following: 
J. Craig Smith 
Smith Hartvigsen 
1150 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GLYNN F. WAYMENT, 
EDWARD C. ENGLAND, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs 
WILLIAM HOWARD, 
LEE HOWARD, 
Defendants. 
This has been an extremely difficult case to decide. It has been difficult to decide for a 
multitude of reasons. First, it has been hotly contested by both sides. Second, the evidence, 
exhibits, and testimony presented to the Court, for its consideration, were fairly extensive. Third, 
the issues are important. Historically, water right cases in Utah have important consequences, 
especially during drought cycles, similar to the one the State of Utah is currently facing. Fourth, 
this appears to be an issue of first impression. The Court could find no single case that was 
dispositive of this particular dispute. In fact, the cases submitted, by both sides, supported 
individual points, made by the parties, but did not resolve the entire case. As a result, there were 
a large number of water cases that the Court had to read and analyze. Finally, there are equities 
on both sides. 
The Court finds that the Defendants' dike does, in fact, interfere with the Plaintiffs' water 
8 ' 7 
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jjjj right. (Although the Plaintiffs referred to Defendants' structure as a 'dam' and the Defendants 
referred to the structure as a 'dike/ the Court finds the word 'dike' to be more descriptive of the 
structure in this case.) In reaching its factual and legal conclusions, there are several legal 
principles that this Court finds helpful. 
First, the case law supports the fact that the means and methods one uses to appropriate 
water are legally protected. See Salt Lake City v. Gardner, 39 Utah 30 (1911). Although this 
protection is not absolute, any change must result in the conditions being maintained 
substantially as they existed at the time of the water appropriation. East Bench Irrigation Co. v. 
Deseret Irrigation Co., 2 Utah 2d 170 (1954). This means that the Plaintiffs water rights and 
their method of appropriating that water are protected. The Defendants cannot unilaterally limit 
or restrict the Plaintiffs use of their appropriated water. 
Secondly, parties have vested rights that the quantity of water available for their use shall 
not be decreased. Lower water appropriators have a right to have water come down the stream in 
the volume and at the times that it customarily came down before. Again, see East Bench 
Irrigation Co. v. Deseret Irrigation Co., 2 Utah 2d 170 (1954). 
Third, this Court could find no case that would allow one water user to unilaterally 
regulate the water appropriation of another water user. That type of regulation belongs to the 
Utah State Water Engineer. See Lasson v. Seely, 120 Utah 679 (1951). While the Defendants 
have a right to be concerned about what they perceive to be the Plaintiffs' abuse or overuse of 
their appropriated water, Defendants do not have the right to regulate the Plaintiffs' flow of 
Page three 
Decision 
Case 010903790 
Wayment vs Howard 
water, even if the Defendants' regulation of Plaintiffs' water is consistent with the Plaintiffs' 
recorded water right appropriation. This is one of the equities of this case, which creates 
difficulty for the Court, because the evidence does support a finding that the Plaintiffs may have, 
at times, been abusing or overusing their water right by flood irrigating more acres than they are 
entitled to irrigate under their certificate. The difficulty is that the Defendants do not have the 
right to unilaterally construct a structure that restricts, regulates, or limits Plaintiffs appropriated 
water. The responsibility to regulate water appropriation belongs to someone else. 
Fourth, the Defendants do not have the right to impound unappropriated water that affects 
Plaintiffs right to use their appropriated water. See Logan, Hyde Park & Smithfield Canal Co. et 
al v. Logan City, 72 Utah 721 (1928). So, again, the Defendants cannot erect a structure, dike or 
dam, that prohibits, limits, restricts, or regulates Plaintiffs' water without the permission of the 
Utah State Water Engineer. See Lasson v. Seely, 120 Utah 679 (1951). 
Finally, although no one particular case this Court has reviewed, is totally dispositive, the 
case of Lasson v. Seely, 120 Utah 679 (1951), has a remarkably similar fact pattern. In Lasson, 
the Defendant built a dam, in a slough, that allegedly deprived the Plaintiff landowner of water 
for irrigation of his fields. This is basically what occurred in this case. Furthermore, in Lasson, 
the Utah Supreme Court enjoined the Defendant from building a dam unless he acquired 
approval from the Utah State Water Engineer. 
This case is further complicated by the fact that the Court finds that this entire situation 
has been aggravated by the Defendants' failure to dredge their property. There is nothing wrong 
tv 
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§ or inappropriate about the Defendants failure to dredge, but their failure to dredge, when the 
Plaintiffs did dredge their property, affected the slough and how it naturally operated. The 
Defendants cannot compensate for their failure to dredge, by building a dike, that again changes 
the natural operation of the slough to the detriment of the Plaintiffs' water rights. The Defendants 
can choose not to dredge, but there may be consequences to their failure to do so. 
Having found that the Defendants' dike does, in fact, interfere with the Plaintiffs' water 
rights, the next issue is determining what the appropriate remedy should be. This Court has found 
legal precedence that would allow this Court to order removal of the dike, deepening of the 
channel, use of a bigger drainage pipe, or any other appropriate method of restoring the 
Plaintiffs' water right. See Adams v. Portage Irrigation Reservoir and Power Co., 95 Utah 1 
(1957). Because of the benefits that the Defendants receive to their property, from the installation 
of the dike, this Court is hesitant to order the removal of the entire dike. The primary benefit to 
the Defendants is that the Defendants have greater access to the back parts of their property via 
the dike. The Court's preference is to order the dike altered so as to allow the traditional flow of 
water through the dike. This could be accomplished several ways. Deepening the channel and 
lowering the drain pipe, or, enlarging the drain pipe, or, adding additional drain pipes appear to 
be both reasonable and feasible alternatives. In addition, the Defendants could dredge the slough 
on their property equal to the dredging done on the Plaintiffs' property and thus return the entire 
operation of the slough closer to its original natural state. The Defendants are ordered to modify 
their dike, by using one of the above described methods, and return the slough, as close as 
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 D r j o r natural state and operating condition. The Court admits that there may be 
^ssible, to i P 
t tives to modifying the Defendants' dike that may be more reasonable, feasible and 
»er ** 
i +uo-n the ones that have been outlined above. If the parties have such alternatives, | n o m i c a l t h a n x n 
*" i-A-^ ^n Havs from the date this judgment is signed, by the Court, to submit those 
have iiiteen w ; , 
r +~ +>IP Court for consideration. The Court further orders the modification of the dike 
natives., to trie ^ w > 
oc oo^n as practicable. In addition, the Defendants are permanently enjoined from prurience —, - -
"
 xerference with Plaintiffs water rights. Finally, the Plaintiffs are further awarded 
putt costs. 
v-> <?el for the Plaintiffs will please prepare Findings of Facts, Conclusions of Law and a 
l i t , consistent with this Ruling. 
pated this 26rd day of April, 2004. 
t- r-v { ) / I | K I 1 
Judge W. Brent West 
Second District Court 
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STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT FOR WEBER COUNTY 
w A y M E N T and EDWARD C. 
plaintiffs, 
H 0 WARD and LEE R. HOWARD 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 010903790 
Judge; W. Brent West 
lliis matter was tried to the bench on November 13, 14 and 17, 2003. Plaintiffs were 
Id represented by John H. Mabey, Jr. and David C. Wright. Defendants were present 
| | | ented b y J- Craig Smith and Scott Crook. I 
| | ng considered the testimonial, documentary and other evidence and the argument of 
:
. hav ing personally viewed the subject properties and area in question on November 
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j* 14, and incorporating by reference the court's supplemental Decision of April 26, 2004, the 
w 
Court hereby makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiffs own water right no. 35-8073, certificated in 1916, consisting of .5 cubic 
feet per second for irrigation between May 1 and September 30. Specifically, the Certificate 
permits a flow of .5 cubic feet per second (cfs) of water to iixigate 25 acres of property located in 
the north half of the northeast quarter of Section 13, Township 6 North, Range 3 West for the 
period of May 1 to September 30 of each year. Additionally, the Certificate limits the volume of 
use to 3 acre feet of water per irrigable acre. 
2. Plaintiffs' predecessor filed the Proof of Appropriation on April 27, 1915. The 
water is diverted by way of a pump, flume and ditch. 
3. That water right source is a slough, commonly called the Marriot Slough 
(hereinafter the "slough55). The slough is fed by several tributary sources, including 
drains, ditches and natural runoff. Although not drawn to scale the following drawing 
generally illustrates the slough as it passes through the properties of the parties to this 
claim. The property or slough boundaries are not exact and the boundaries of certain lots 
are not shown on the map. Additionally, the reference to "Howard's Dam" is actually a 
reference to the Howard's dike. 
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4. A dam (referred to as the "diversion dam") on the north end of the slough is used 
and has always been used to allow the slough to fill so that the water can then be pumped to 
plaintiffs5 crops. After pumping, the slough refills, and then when needed, the pump is turned on 
for another watering cycle. This process is referred to below as the "pumping and refilling 
cycle." 
5. At the end of the irrigation season, that diversion dam is typically opened so that 
the slough can drain. 
6. The water right Application describes the nature of the slough and how the water 
was/is obtained. The pumping cycle is described in the Proof of Appropriation. 
7. Plaintiffs divert their water from a pump located at a low point on the Wayment 
property. The slough water flows by gravity to that point and is pumped several feet uphill to 
reach the Wayment and England properties. 
1452 
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H 8. This pumping and refilling cycle is how plaintiffs' water right has been used 
in 
historically and is the means or method by which plaintiffs use their water right and have used 
their water right. 
9. The original appropriator, Mary E. Marriot, explained in her June 10, 1915, letter 
to the State Engineer how the slough operated when the wrater right was first approved. She 
explained that she used the dam at the end of the slough to fill the slough and store water, 
allowing it to be pumped for irrigation. 
10. At the end of the irrigating season, the diversion dam was breached, allowing the 
slough to empty. That is how the slough and the water right are used today. Plaintiffs5 water 
right cannot be used without this pumping and refilling cycle. 
11. During the pumping cycle, plaintiffs pump more than .5 cubic feet per second 
from the Marriot Slough. The pump plaintiffs use to divert water from the Marriot Slough 
'Hiinps between 7 to 10 cubic feet r*er second. 
12. Since 1998, plaintiffs have used water from the slough to irrigate land other than 
the 25 acres of land located in the north half of the northeast quarter of Section 13, Township 6 
North, Range 3 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian (SLBM), identified in the Certificate. 
Plaintiffs irrigate an approximate total of 115 acres with water diverted from the slough. This 
water includes the water identified in the Certificate and additional water plaintiffs have added 
by way of water shares in Warren Irrigation Company and 200 acre feet of water purchased by 
plaintiff England from Weber Basin Water Conservancy District. All of this water is delivered 
to the slough and then used by plaintiffs for irrigation. 
145 
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13. Plaintiffs divert water from the Warren Canal to the slough. Plaintiff Wayment 
took the matter of using Warren irrigation water on his property to the Warren Irrigation board of 
directors. The board did not object to that use. 
14. The slough is also controlled in part, and has been for many years, by way of a tin 
located in a ditch that runs parallel to 5900 West. This tin functions, and it or other functionally 
similar methods have always functioned, as another control device for regulating the level and 
flow of the slough to allow plaintiffs to irrigate. 
15. Benchland Investments LTD owns property located in the northern half of 
the northeast Section 13, Township 6 North, Range 3 West, SLBM, specifically identified 
as follows: 
Beginning at a point 2 rods west of the northeast comer of section 13, Township 6 
North, Range 3 West, Salt Lake Meridian, U.S. Survey; and running thence south 
29 rods thence north 89°46'47" west 146.10 feet, thence south 89°11'08" west 
402.61 feet, thence north 87°36,30" west 97.30 feet, more or less, to a fence 
comer, thence south 0°54M0" west 219.35 feet, thence south 0r20'55" east 44.68 
feet, thence south 0°14?26" east 31.47 feet, thence south 0°43'49" west 89.09 feet, 
thence south 01°48'04" west 199.55 feet, more or less, to a fence comer, thence 
south 88°48'02" east 295.73 feet, thence south 15 rods, thence west 2255 feet, 
thence north 80 rods, thence east 158 rods to the place of beginning. 
16. Just south of the Giardano Subdivision is a 2.33 acre lot owned by 
Plaintiff Edward C. England and his wife, Joann E. England, more specifically described 
Part of the Northeast Quarter of Section 13, Township 6 North, Range 3 West, 
Salt Lake Meridian, U.S. Survey: Beginning at a point 2 Rods West and 65 rods 
south from the northeast comer of said quarter section, running thence north 150 
feet, thence west 647.73 feet, thence south 01 deg. 48 min. 04 sec. West 150.00 
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feet, more or less, to a fence corner, thence south 88 deg. 48 min. 02 sec. east 
649.73 feet to the place of beginning. Subject to a right of way of 5900 West 
Street over east 2 rods. 
17. Plaintiff Edward C. England and Joann E. England also own property 
located in the northern half of the northeast quarter Section 13, Township 6 North, Range 
3 West, SLBM, specifically identified as follows: 
The south half of the northeast quarter of section 13, Township 6 North, 
Range 3 West, Salt Lake Meridian, U.S. Survey. Less that portion of 
Roadway thereon, heretofore sold and conveyed to Weber County. Except 
that Portion deeded to Gary Christensen in Book 1430, page 2253. Except 
that portion deeded to Tracy Smith and Tamra A. Smith in Book 1495, 
page 2528. 
18. Lee Howard or Norma Birda Howard, Trustees of the Howard Family 
Trust, dated November 19, 1992, own property identified as the Howard Property on the 
drawing found in paragraph 3 of the Findings of Fact, located in the north half of the 
southeast quarter of Section 13, Township 6 North, Range 3 West, SLBM,, and the north 
half of the southwest quarter of Section 18, Township 6 North Range 2 West, SLBM and 
specifically identified as follows: 
The north Vi of the southeast quarter of section 13, Township 6 North, 
Range 3 West, Salt Lake Meridian, U.S. Survey: Except that portion 
conveyed to George A. Muirbrook and Wife Shirley A. Muirbrook in 
Book 916, Page 77. 
Also part of the southwest quarter of section 18, Township 6 North, Range 2 West, Salt Lake 
Meridian, U.S. Survey: Beginning east 138.2 feet to the west line of the county road and north 
along said road 500 feet from the southwest comer of the north l/2 of said quarter section; thence 
northerly along the west line of said county road to west line of said quarter section; thence south 
along said line to the north property line of the George A. Muirbrook property conveyed in Book 
916, Page 77; Thence northeast along said line to beginning. 
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19. Neither of the defendants owns a water right. Defendant Lee Howard owns 
shares in the Knight Irrigation Company and irrigates using that water from a diversion point 
south of the separation tin as identified on the drawing reproduced in paragraph 3. 
20. The slough has a generally south to north flow, but that flow can change 
depending on conditions, including the pumping cycle. 
21. The relevant portion of the slough begins at the north end of property owned by 
plaintiff Wayment, continues southward through the England property, then through the Lee 
Howard property, and terminates at a point identified by the parties as the "separation tin" on 
property owned by Knight Irrigation Company. 
22. Plaintiffs and all irrigators in Weber County are entitled to four acre-feet of water 
per acre of land irrigated. Although the Certificate provides for a duty of 3 acre feet per acre 
irrigated, that duty was increased for Weber County. 
23. In the spring of 1998, without a permit from the State Engineer, defendants built a 
dike in the portion of the slough that runs through the Lee Howard property. The dike was 
enlarged in February of 2000. 
24. Lee Howard contacted the United States Army Corps, of Engineers in connection 
with his construction of the dike. The Corps of engineers granted a nationwide permit to 
construct the dike and instructed him to install two pipes on the hard pan, down on the ground in 
the mud. 
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S 25. Defendants installed at least two pipes in the dike, a 36 inch pipe, which sits 
\n 
roughly in the middle of the dike, and a 15 inch pipe, which sits several feet north of the larger 
pipe. 
26. The dike is upstream from one of the primary tributaries to the slough, known as 
the West Warren Drain. This drain delivers irrigation runoff water from property to the west. 
27 Installed to permit access across the slough to a portion of Lee Howard's 
property, the dike includes two visible pipes, one 36" in diameter, and another 15" in diameter. 
28. Neither plaintiffs nor defendants have taken any flow measurements in the slough. 
Plaintiffs have diverted more than 75 acre-feet of water from the Marriot Slough during the 
period May 1 to September 30. Plaintiffs irrigate more acreage than the 25 specified in the 
Certificate. 
29. The dike interferes with plaintiffs' water right by affecting the slough and how it 
naturally operated. The dike has decreased or slowed the flow of water to plaintiffs' pump and 
otherwise changed the way the slough functions by changing its flow. The dike also threatens to 
interfere with plaintiffs' water right in the future. 
30. The dike forced plaintiffs to hold the water level in the slough higher to allow the 
water to reach the pipes in the dike. This made it harder for plaintiffs to irrigate by slowing the 
irrigation process. 
31. Holding the water higher also caused water to pool or meander into areas on the 
Lee Howard property where defendants claimed it had not historically gone. 
8 
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32. Defendant William Howard once removed the tin in the 5900 West ditch, causing 
the slough to partially drain. 
33. In 2000, Weber County began dredging the slough. Defendant Lee Howard 
requested that the county stop that dredging work at his property line. Plaintiffs then paid to 
have the slough on their property dredged so that the water would flow more freely. Plaintiffs 
failed to obtain a dredging permit, and dredging was stopped while the Army Corps of Engineers 
investigated the matter. Later, the Army Corps permitted plaintiffs to dredge. Defendants did 
not allow any dredging on their property. 
34. Because the dike forced plaintiffs to hold water in the slough higher, and because 
defendant Lee Howard did not dredge his property, plaintiffs did not commit trespass or nuisance 
by dredging or causing water to flow onto defendant Lee Howard's property. Any damage is the 
result of the effect of defendants' dike on how the slough naturally operated and defendant Lee 
Howard's decision not to dredge. 
35. Neither have plaintiffs created a nuisance, trespassed or been negligent by their 
use of their water right, including operation or use of the drain tin in the ditch along 5900 West. 
Plaintiffs' water right and their method of appropriating water are protected. As a result, use of 
the tin to dam the slough is legal. Temporary damming has always been part of plaintiffs' 
approved methodology in irrigating their property. 
36. Plaintiff Wayment owns 143 shares of Warren Irrigation Company. Plaintiff 
England owns ten shares and leases another four shares. To compensate for the change in the 
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5 flow caused by the dike and to irrigate additional acreage, plaintiffs used their Wan-en Irrigation 
vi 
water to supplement their irrigation needs. 
37. Plaintiff England also purchased 200 acre feet of additional water from Weber 
Basin Water Conservancy District for additional irrigation. 
38. England's Weber Basin water is diverted from the Weber River pursuant to an 
approved Exchange Application, no. E4199 (35-11189). England has not obtained approval 
from the State Engineer to divert that water from the slough. Defendants protested that exchange 
application. 
39. Defendants protested plaintiff England's effort to purchase additional water from 
Weber Basin. 
40. In 1996, plaintiffs filed Application to Appropriate Number A71312 (35-10520) 
in an effort to appropriate and use additional water from the slough. Defendants, among others, 
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his conclusion that there was insufficient unappropriated water in the slough. 
41. Plaintiffs may have, at times, abused or overused their water right by irrigating 
more than the 25 acres they are entitled to under their water right. 
42. Plaintiffs did not obtain formal State Engineer approval for using their Warren 
Irrigation shares on their land. It is common, however, for different parcels to be irrigated within 
an approved place of use. Warren Irrigation Company's water right includes approved use 
within section 13, where plaintiffs' land is located, although the precise parcels irrigated by 
plaintiffs with their Warren shares are not part of the original Warren water right as approved. 
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43. Defendants do not have any authority or right to restrict, regulate or limit 
plaintiffs' water use or to regulate the flow or level of the slough. 
44. To remedy the interference with plaintiffs' water right, defendants may deepen 
the slough channel, lower the drain pipe(s) or add additional pipes. They could also dredge the 
slough on their property consistent with the dredging on plaintiffs' property. 
45. Benchland Investments, Ltd. was substituted as a plaintiff for Glynn F. 
Wayment 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Water in Utah is the property of the public, subject to all existing rights to the use 
thereof. No one may diminish, obstruct or interfere with the approved water rights of another. 
2. An appropriator of water from a stream or body of water also acquires the right to 
continue to use his method or means of diverting by which the water right is beneficially used. 
3. A property owner may not impound, obstruct or impede in any maimer the free 
and natural flow of water to which a senior appropriators is entitled at his point of diversion. 
4. Defendants are not permitted to regulate plaintiffs' water right specifically or the 
flow or level of the slough generally. That type of regulation is the responsibility of the Utah 
State Engineer and/or others. The fact that plaintiffs pump more than .5 cfs during the pumping 
cycle does not invalidate the water right as long as the water is being put to beneficial use. 
5. Defendants' dike constitutes interference with plaintiffs' water right. Defendants 
are ordered to modify the dike, by using one of the above-described methods, to return the 
11 
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5 slough, as close as possible, to its prior natural state and operating condition. The modification 
in 
of the dike is to commence as soon as practicable. 
6. Should defendants have proposals for other methods of returning the slough to its 
historic flow, they must submit those proposals to the court within fifteen days after entry of the 
Judgment. 
7. Defendants are permanently enjoined from any further interference with 
plaintiffs' water rights. They are pemianently enjoined from impounding, obstructing, or 
impeding in any manner the free and natural flow of the slough. 
8. Plaintiffs' withdrew their trespass claim at trial. That claim is therefore 
dismissed, with prejudice. 
9. Defendants' counterclaims for trespass, nuisance and negligence are hereby 
dismissed, with prejudice. 
intentionally blanks 
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10. As the prevailing parties, plaintiffs are awarded their costs pursuant to rule 54(d) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
11. The parties are responsible for their own attorney fees. 
rVxft^  l l _ , 2005. 
BY THE COURT r
  T^ ±_r) 
W. Brent West 
District Court Judge 
Approved as to form: 
J. Craig Smith 
Attorney for defendants 
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This matter was tried to the bench on November 13, 14 and 17, 2003. Plaintiffs were 
present and represented by John H. Mabey, Jr. and David C. Wright. Defendants were present 
and represented by J. Craig Smith and Scott Crook. 
Having considered the testimonial, documentary and other evidence and the argument of 
counsel, and having viewed the subject properties and area in question on November 14, and 
incorporating by reference the court's Decisions of April 26, 2004 and August 23, 2004, and 
consistent with the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that 
1. Defendants are to modify the dike that is the subject of this action by using one of 
the methods described in the court's Findings and Conclusions, to return the slough, as close as 
possible, to its prior natural state and operating condition. That modification is to commence as 
soon as practicable. 
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historic flow, they must submit those proposals to the court within fifteen days after entry of this 
Judgment. 
3. Defendants are permanently enjoined from any further interference with 
plaintiffs' water right. They are permanently enjoined from impounding, obstructing or 
impeding in any manner the free and natural flow of the slough. 
4. Plaintiffs' trespass claim is dismissed, with prejudice. 
5. Defendants' counterclaims for trespass, nuisance and negligence are hereby 
dismissed, with prejudice. 
6. As the prevailing parties, plaintiffs are awarded their costs pursuant to rule 54(d) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to be established by a Memorandum of Costs. 
7. The parties are responsible for their own attorney fees. 
fttA^ 0 _ ? 2005. 
BY THE COURT ^ 
W. Brent West 
District Court Judge 
Approved as to form: 
J. Craig Smith 
Attorney for defendants 
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[ ] Certified Mail, Receipt No. , return receipt requested 
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WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GLYNN F. WAYMENT and 
EDWARD C. ENGLAND, 
Plaintiffs, DECISION 
vs 
WILLIAM HOWARD and 
LEE R. HOWARD, 
Defendants. 
Case No.: 
Judge: 
010903790 
W. Brent West 
Pamela All An 
O. M J . X 1 V 1 U J. AJL.J. VJ.J. 
This case has taken on an interesting life of its own. In light of the Court's following 
Ruling, it will not be necessary for the Court to have a hearing as requested. Also, the Court 
apologizes for not being more clear in its original Ruling. The issues contained in the 
Defendants' Counterclaim were addressed mferentially, but not directly. The Court will now try 
to clear up any confusion or ambiguity. 
First, the Defendants' trespass claim was formally withdrawn at trial. 
The Defendants' second claim is dismissed with no cause for action. In its earlier 
decision, this Court found specifically that the Plaintiffs' water rights and their method of 
appropriating water are protected. As a result, use of the tin plates to dam the slough is legal. 
The evidence, at trial, was that damming the canals are the way that the Plaintiffs have always 
increased the water in the slough to a level where they could flood irrigate their property. 
VD18042302 
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Temporary damming has always been part of the Plaintiffs approved methodology in irrigating 
their property. 
The Defendants' third claim is also dismissed with no cause of action, but for a different 
reason. The Court's original ruling does not prohibit the Defendants from having access to all 
portions of their property. The Court did not order removal of the dike. Rather, the Court ordered 
that the dike be reconstructed in such a way that the slough operated the same way it did before 
the dike was constructed. Such a reconstruction would still permit or allow the Defendants access 
to all portions of their land. In addition, the Defendants constructed the dike. It could have been 
constructed in a way that did not cause them damage. 
The final issue to be addressed is the Plaintiffs' request that the Court amend its prior 
Ruling to include a decision concerning a second alleged interference with Plaintiffs' water 
rights. The Plaintiffs now allege that the Defendants have deposited mounds of dirt or soil that 
have narrowed the slough and again interferes with the Plaintiffs water rights. Although judicial 
economy makes it tempting for the Court to reach out and decide this matter, the Court is of the 
opinion that legally, it cannot reach this issue, under the present circumstances. This second 
situation has arisen since the Court decided the first issue of alleged interference with Plaintiffs' 
water rights, but before a final Judgment was entered. Also, the Court does not have a sufficient 
factual understanding, nor enough evidence presented, that would allow the Court to make a 
decision that the Plaintiffs' water rights are again being interfered with by the Defendants deposit 
of soil. 
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Hopefully, this decision supplements the first decision sufficiently for the Plaintiffs to 
prepare Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and a Judgment, consistent with the Court's 
Rulings. The issue of the Defendants' alleged second interference with the Plaintiffs' water rights 
remains alive and well for litigation at another time. 
Dated this 23rd day of August 2004. 
Judge W. Brent West 
Second District Court 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Decision to the parties as 
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John I-J, Matey, Jr. 
David C. Wright 
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Salt Lake City, Ut 84111 
Dated this 25th day of August, 2004.
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1211 
2 0 0 5 UT 58 
This opinion is subject to revision before final 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
00O00 
Lawrence W. Searle and No. 20040406 
Ann C. Searle, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
Milburn Irrigation Company, 
William M. Hamilton, and 
The Utah State Engineer, Jerry 
D. Olds, P.E., 
Defendants and Appellees. 
Sixth District, Manti Dep't 
The Honorable David L. Mower 
No. 202600165 
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DURRANT, Justice: 
Hi In this case, we are called upon to address several 
questions concerning the procedure applicable to the approval or 
rejection of applications proposing a change in water use. More 
specifically, we must determine whether the district court 
properly invoked the preponderance of the evidence standard of 
proof and correctly allocated the burden of proof when rejecting 
a change application. Additionally, we must decide whether a 
change applicant's prima facie showing that no impairment of 
vested water rights will result from application approval can be 
successfully undermined by circumstantial evidence demonstrating 
the probability of impairment. 
F I L E D 
September 2, 2005 
%2 When considering the change application at issue in 
this case, the district court utilized a burden-shifting approach 
whereby the change applicant was first required to show ''reason 
to believe" that approval of the application would not result in 
impairment of vested water rights. After that initial showing, 
the district court shifted the burden to the protesting party to 
show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that approval of the 
application would result in impairment of vested rights. We 
conclude that the approach adopted by the district court is 
inharmonious with our case law and that a remand is therefore 
necessary. We hold that an applicant seeking a change in water 
use need only show reason to believe that approval of the 
application will not result in impairment of vested water rights 
and that the applicant bears the burden of persuasion throughout 
the application process. A protestant may, however, successfully 
oppose application approval by producing either direct or 
circumstantial evidence that sufficiently undermines the 
applicant's showing that the use proposed can be accomplished 
without impairing vested rights. After explaining the factual 
background of the present case, we will analyze each of the 
issues identified above. 
BACKGROUND 
%3 Appellants Lawrence and Ann Searle own property on the 
Wasatch Plateau, which plateau forms the east boundary of the 
Sanpete Valley in Sanpete County, Utah. The Searles purchased 
the property in 1999, intending to construct a cabin on the site. 
However, in order for the Searles to obtain a building permit, 
they were required to establish the presence of an on-site source 
of water sufficient to meet the needs of the cabin. 
1|4 In an effort to satisfy this requirement, the Searles 
purchased water right number 65-2977, which carries a priority 
date of 1956. As owners of that water right, every year the 
Searles are entitled to one half-acre foot of water, to be used 
for irrigation purposes, from April 1 to October 31. The point 
of diversion for the Searles' water right is a well located near 
the town of Chester, Utah, in the Sanpete Valley. The Chester 
well is a significant distance from the Searles' cabin property, 
and thus the Searles' water right does not currently satisfy the 
requirement of on-site water. Therefore, after acquiring the 
water right, the Searles sought to change the point of diversion, 
place of use, and nature of use of the water right. 
Specifically, the Searles desired to change the point of 
diversion to an existing well, known as the Jacobsen well, 
located near their cabin property, and to use the water for 
stockwatering and domestic purposes year round, rather than for 
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seasonal irrigation. Taking the first step in the process to 
perfect such a change in use, the Searles properly completed and 
filed a change application with the State Engineer. The change 
application was advertised as required by the Utah Code, Utah 
Code Ann. § 73-3-6 (Supp. 2004), and Appellee Milburn Irrigation 
Company ("Milburn") timely protested the Searles' application. 
15 Milburn is a Utah corporation consisting of 
approximately twenty-six shareholders and is operated with the 
purpose of distributing water to its shareholders via gravity-
pressurized sprinkler irrigation systems. Milburn owns water 
right number 65-2256, which carries a priority date of 1876. 
Milburn7s water right entitles the company to divert 8.875 cubic 
feet of water per second from the South San Pitch River, also 
known as the South Fork of the San Pitch River, annually during 
the period of April 1 to October 15, to irrigate 63 9.9 acres. 
Typically, Milburn is not able to satisfy the entire amount of 
its water right during that period, as water flow slows as the 
summer wears on. By August, Milburn is usually only able to 
divert just one cubic foot per second. 
%6 Milburn's protest against the Searles' change 
application was motivated by Milburn's concern that the Jacobsen 
well, which is located in the drainage area that contributes to 
Milburn's sources of water, is connected in some degree with 
Milburn's water source and that the Searles' use of that well 
could further exacerbate water shortfalls that Milburn has been 
experiencing for many years. 
H7 The State Engineer convened a hearing to address the 
concerns raised by Milburn's protest. After hearing testimony 
and argument concerning the possibility of a connection between 
the Jacobsen well and Milburn's water source, the State Engineer 
rejected the Searles' change application, concluding that "the 
area proposed for diversion could serve as a contributing source 
for [Milburn's] water supply." After the Searles' request for 
reconsideration was denied, the Searles filed the current action, 
seeking judicial review of the State Engineer's decision.1 
1
 Change application proceedings are designated as informal 
adjudicative proceedings, see Utah Admin. Code R655-6-2 (2005), 
for which judicial review under the Administrative Procedures Act 
is available. See Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-14 (1989); see also id. 
§ 63-46b-15 (1) (a) (2004) (M[D]istrict courts have jurisdiction to 
review by trial de novo all final agency actions resulting from 
informal adjudicative proceedings . . . . " ) ; Utah Admin. Code 
R655-6-18 (providing for judicial review in accordance with 
(continued...) 
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H 8 The district court, hearing evidence de novo, was 
supplied with testimony from three expert witnesses on the issue 
of impairment. The Searles' expert, Gerald B. Robinson, Jr., 
testified that the deep water aquifer supplying the Jacobsen well 
is not connected to Milburn's water source. According to 
Robinson, if Milburn's water source was connected to the Jacobsen 
well, Milburn would not experience water shortfall in the summer 
months because the deep aquifer would keep the river saturated at 
all times. Robinson also testified that Milburn's water source 
does not exhibit the artesian pressure found in the Jacobsen well 
and that is generally observed in the Sanpete Valley, an 
indication that the water sources are independent of one another. 
%9 Two expert witnesses countered Robinson's conclusion. 
Both experts were of the opinion that the two water sources are 
connected in some fashion. Kirk Forbush testified that, while 
Robinson may be correct that water from the Jacobsen well 
generally travels in such a fashion as to bypass Milburn's water 
source, some of that water is contributing to the base flow of 
the South San Pitch River. Forbush reasoned that since the South 
San Pitch River has a base flow regardless of whether there is 
snow melt, the river must have an additional source of water. He 
further testified that the Jacobsen well is located in a 
formation that supplies water from consolidated rock into springs 
and streams, which, in turn, augment the flow of the San Pitch 
River. Accordingly, Forbush concluded that if the Searles use 
water from the Jacobsen well, Milburn's water supply will suffer. 
Charles Williamson, a stream alteration specialist, essentially 
concurred in the reasoning of Forbush, but also suggested that 
the lack of artesian pressure at Milburn's water source and the 
presence of such pressure at the Jacobsen well could possibly be 
explained by elevation differences. 
1(10 After hearing the evidence relevant to the impairment 
issue, the district court reached the same conclusion as the 
State Engineer, stating in a ruling from the bench that 
"I'm . . . convinced that there's--by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that the rights of [Milburn] will be impaired if the 
application is approved." The Searles now appeal from the 
district court's order denying their change application. On 
appeal, the Searles contend that the district court imposed an 
impermissibly light burden on Milburn. 
1
 (...continued) 
sections 63-46b-14 and -15 of the Utah Code). 
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1|ll Specifically, the Searles maintain that once they 
established a prima facie case that approval of their change 
application would not result in the impairment of vested rights, 
the burden shifted to Milburn to show that the approval of the 
application would actually result in such impairment, not merely 
that impairment would likely occur. Therefore, the Searles claim 
that the district court incorrectly required Milburn to meet its 
burden by a preponderance of the evidence. According to the 
Searles, Milburn7s burden should have been much higher. Although 
the Searles shy away from labeling the standard they feel should 
be properly imposed in circumstances such as this, they are, in 
essence, requesting a rule that requires parties protesting 
change applications to provide clear and convincing evidence 
demonstrating impairment before a change application can be 
rejected. 
1|l2 Taking a different approach, the State Engineer urges 
us to affirm the result reached by the district court, but to 
repudiate the burden-shifting scheme it utilized. According to 
the State Engineer, the burden of persuasion remains on change 
applicants throughout the application process to establish by a 
preponderance of the evidence that application approval will not 
result in impairment. Milburn argues, however, that we should 
affirm the district court and expressly adopt the burden-shifting 
approach it used. After articulating the appropriate standard of 
review, we will address the parties' arguments. We have 
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code section 78-2-2 (f) (2002) . 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Hl3 To resolve the issues before us, we must determine 
whether the district court (1) properly invoked the preponderance 
of the evidence standard of proof, (2) appropriately allocated 
the burden of proof, and (3) correctly concluded that a change 
applicant's prima facie showing that no impairment will result 
from application approval can be undermined by circumstantial 
evidence demonstrating the probability of impairment. 
1)14 As to the first issue, we review a district court's 
determination of the proper standard of proof for correctness, as 
discerning the appropriate standard to apply in any given case 
involves statutory interpretation or interpretation of case law. 
See generally State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935 (Utah 1994) 
("Legal determinations . . . are defined as those which are not 
of fact but are essentially of rules or principles uniformly 
applied to persons of similar qualities and status in similar 
circumstances."); see also Hansen v. Hansen, 958 P.2d 931, 933 
(Utah Ct. App. 1998) (reviewing a trial court's invocation of a 
5 No. 20040406 
clear and convincing standard of proof for correctness)/ In re 
R.N.J., 908 P.2d 345, 349 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (stating that 
whether a trial court applied the appropriate standard of proof 
is a question reviewed for correctness) superceded by statute on 
other grounds as stated in In re E.H.H., 2000 UT App 368, % 16, 
16 P.3d 1257. The identical standard of review applies to the 
second issue on appeal, as it is well established that we review 
a court's allocation of the burden of proof for correctness. 
Beaver County v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 916 P.2d 344, 357 (Utah 
1996) . 
^15 Finally, turning to the third issue on appeal, we note 
that we have never had occasion to articulate the standard of 
review applicable to a district court's rejection of a change 
application when the ground for that rejection is the probability 
that vested water rights will be impaired by the use proposed in 
the application. This issue is best viewed as a mixed question 
of fact and law, as the district court must first find facts 
relevant to the issue of impairment and then determine whether 
those facts are within the ambit of ''impairment, " such that the 
change application should be rejected. See Jensen v. IHC Hosps., 
Inc., 2003 UT 51, % 57 n.ll, 82 P.3d 1076 ("A mixed question 
involves . . . the determination of whether a given set of facts 
comes within the reach of a given rule of law." (internal 
quotation omitted)); cf. Butler, Crockett & Walsh Dev. Corp. v. 
Pinecrest Pipeline Operating Co., 2004 UT 67, ^ 43, 98 P.3d 1 
(reviewing a district court's determination that water was put to 
beneficial use as a mixed question of fact and law) . 
1J16 When reviewing a district court's conclusion regarding 
a mixed question of fact and law, we typically grant some level 
of deference to the district court's application of the law to 
the facts. See Pena, 869 P.2d at 937-39 (discussing role of 
appellate courts in setting limits on the amount of discretion 
district courts enjoy when applying law to facts) . "The measure 
of discretion afforded varies, however, according to the issue 
being reviewed." State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, 1 26, 63 P. 3d 
650. We consider multiple factors when determining how much 
deference to grant a district court's application of law to 
facts. Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 1244 (Utah 1998). 
Specifically, we analyze whether (l) the facts at issue are so 
complex, and arise in such variation, that it would be 
impractical to supply a rule that adequately accounts for the 
implications of all the facts; (2) the context in which the 
application of law to facts occurs is somehow novel or new, such 
that appellate courts are unable to discern and clearly state 
what factors are outcome determinative; and (3) the district 
court has observed facts that are not adequately preserved by a 
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record of the proceedings before it, e.g., witness demeanor. 
Pena, 869 P.2d at 938-39. 
1)17 In the present case, consideration of the three 
Pena factors leads us to conclude that at least some deference 
should be granted to the district court's application of the law 
to the facts. First, there are myriad factual scenarios, 
interplaying with complex scientific principles, that can arise 
when determining whether approval of a change application will 
result in impairment of vested rights, making it exceedingly 
difficult to craft a uniform rule neatly applicable in all 
situations. See generally Crafts v. Hansen, 667 P.2d 1068, 1071-
80 (Utah 1983) (discussing in detail the affidavits of experts 
who addressed various factual scenarios when opining as to the 
possibility of impairment in five separate cases involving change 
applications). Second, although reported cases discussing the 
possibility of impairment stretch far back in this state's 
history, our case law has not yet meaningfully constrained a 
district court's discretion to conclude that evidence of 
impairment is sufficient to prevent approval of a change 
application. Third, and finally, the district court enjoys an 
appreciable advantage over appellate courts in this context due 
to its ability to assess witness demeanor and credibility, 
factors that are not readily discernable from a cold record. See 
Pinecrest Pipeline Operating Co., 2004 UT 67 at 1 48. 
Hl8 However, given the importance of water in this state, 
there is a strong public policy interest in promoting consistent 
and predictable results in disputes over the permissible use of 
that water. Therefore, it is appropriate that district court 
discretion be somewhat constrained in this area. See Jeffs, 970 
P.2d at 1244 (stating that appellate courts, when setting 
discretionary limits, should consider the policy interest in 
creating ''standard uniformity among trial courts addressing the 
question"). Consequently, we conclude that district courts enjoy 
significant, but not broad, discretion when determining whether 
evidence of impairment is sufficiently compelling to foreclose 
application approval. Cf. Pinecrest Pipeline Operating Co., 2004 
UT 67 at i) 50 (granting "signif icant, though not broad, 
discretion" to a district court determination that water had been 
put to beneficial use). Having outlined the appropriate 
standards of review, we now turn to the issues raised in this 
appeal. 
ANALYSIS 
1|l9 To resolve the issues before us, we must determine 
whether the district court (1) properly invoked the preponderance 
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of the evidence standard of proof, (2) appropriately allocated 
the burden of proof, and (3) correctly concluded that a change 
applicant's prima facie showing that no impairment will result 
from application approval can be undermined by circumstantial 
evidence demonstrating the probability of impairment. 
1J2 0 On appeal, Milburn contends that the district court's 
approach was correct, while both the State Engineer and the 
Searles contend that the district court's approach was flawed. 
Although the State Engineer and the Searles agree that the 
district court's approach was flawed, they disagree as to the 
appropriate outcome of this appeal. Specifically, the State 
Engineer requests that we not disturb the result reached by the 
district court, but that we merely correct the mechanism by which 
that result was reached. In contrast, the Searles request a 
reversal. 
H21 To untangle the threads of the parties' arguments, we 
first provide a brief overview of the change application process 
as well as the approach taken by the district court in the 
present case. We then identify and discuss the appropriate 
standard of proof and the proper allocation of the burden of 
proof in the change application context. Finally, we address the 
Searles' contention that circumstantial evidence demonstrating a 
probability of impairment can never be sufficient to defeat a 
change applicant's prima facie showing that no impairment will 
result from application approval. 
I. THE CHANGE APPLICATION PROCESS AND THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
122 Before turning to the parties' arguments relative to 
the appropriate standard of proof and the proper allocation of 
burdens, we first provide, for purposes of context, a brief 
overview of the change application process itself, as well as the 
procedural course followed by the district court in the present 
case. 
A. The Change Application Process 
H23 Utah law provides that a water right holder is entitled 
to change the point of diversion or the place or nature of use of 
water so long as vested rights are not impaired by the change. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-3(2) (Supp. 2004). The legislature has 
designated the state engineer as the appropriate officer to 
initially determine whether an application seeking permission to 
initiate such a change should be approved. See id. §§ 73-3-3(4), 
73-3-8 (1989 & Supp. 2004). In making that determination, the 
state engineer is statutorily obligated to "follow the same 
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procedures, and the rights and duties of the applicants with 
respect to applications for permanent changes of point of 
diversion, place of use, or purpose of use shall be the same, as 
provided in this title for applications to appropriate water." 
Id,, § 73-3-3 (5) (a) (Supp. 2004). Those elements are codified in 
section 73-3-8 of the Utah Code, which requires, in relevant 
part, that the State Engineer approve an application if the 
following conditions are met: 
(a) there is unappropriated water in the 
proposed source/123 (b) the proposed use will 
not impair existing rights or interfere with 
the more beneficial use of the water; (c) the 
proposed plan is physically and economically 
feasible . . . and would not prove 
detrimental to the public welfare/ (d) the 
applicant has the financial ability to 
complete the proposed works/ and (e) the 
application was filed in good faith and not for purposes of 
speculation or monopoly. 
Id,. § 73-3-8(1) (1989). After an application is approved, the 
applicant is then empowered to take steps to perfect the right to 
use the water in the manner contemplated by the change 
application. See id. §§ 73-3-10, and -16 (Supp. 2004) / Crafts v. 
Hansen, 667 P.2d 1068, 1082 (Utah 1983) (Oaks, J., dissenting). 
1|24 In the present case, both the State Engineer and the 
district court concluded that the Searles satisfied all of the 
obligations outlined in section 73-3-8(1) except the requirement 
that the proposed use not impair existing rights. On appeal, the 
Searles and the State Engineer take exception to the approach 
adopted by the district court in reaching its conclusion. The 
State Engineer maintains that the district court improperly 
shifted the burden of persuasion to Milburn after the Searles 
made a prima facie case demonstrating that no rights would be 
impaired by the approval of their application. Meanwhile, the 
Searles maintain that the district court correctly shifted the 
burden of persuasion, but improperly imposed only the 
preponderance of the evidence standard of proof on the issue of 
impairment. After outlining the approach taken by the district 
court, we will address in turn the parties' allegations of errors 
in that approach. 
2
 This factor is inapplicable in this case, as the Searles 
do not seek to appropriate water, but to change the point of 
diversion and nature of use of previously appropriated water. 
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B. The Approach Adopted bv the District Court 
^25 As mentioned above, the crux of the parties' 
disagreement over the appropriateness of the district court 
proceeding centers on the propriety of the standard of proof 
invoked by the district court, as well as the manner in which the 
court allocated the burden of proof. Our pronouncements on the 
proper standard of proof and the appropriate allocation of the 
burden of proof in the change application context have not 
resulted in a clear approach and, in fact, seem to have 
engendered considerable confusion--evidenced by the fact that all 
three parties to this appeal read our case law on this issue in a 
different manner. 
^26 The district court relied upon our decision in Crafts 
in concluding that change applicants bear an initial burden to 
show reason to believe that no impairment will result from the 
proposed change in use and that a party protesting an application 
must rebut that prima facie showing by a preponderance of the 
evidence. In Crafts, when discussing the standard of proof and 
the appropriate allocation of burden in the change application 
context, we quoted with approval our previous statement on those 
issues found in Salt Lake City v. Boundary Springs Water Users 
Ass'n, in which we stated as follows: 
If the evidence shows that there is reason to 
believe that the proposed change can be made 
without impairing vested rights the 
application should be approved. . . . A 
change application cannot be rejected without 
a showing that vested rights will thereby be 
substantially impaired. While the applicant 
has the general burden of showing that no 
impairment of vested rights will result from 
the change, the person opposing such 
application must fail if the evidence does 
not disclose that his rights will be 
impaired. 
270 P.2d 453, 455 (Utah 1954) (footnotes omitted). Our statement 
in Boundary Springs remains our most definitive pronouncement on 
the standard of proof and allocation of burden in the change 
application context. 
|^27 Although Crafts does contain language touching on those 
issues, that case directly considered only whether a district 
court's entry of summary judgment approving five change 
applications was appropriate. 667 P.2d at 1069. We held that 
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summary judgment was inappropriate under the circumstances and 
remanded the case to the district court. See id. At the 
conclusion of the Crafts opinion, we provided guidance to the 
district court as to the appropriate course to follow after 
remand, stating that 
[t]he determinative question before the trial 
court will be whether there is reason to 
believe, on the basis of current information, 
that existing water rights will not be 
impaired by the changes proposed in the 
applications. Once the respondents make a 
prima facie showing at trial that there is 
reason to believe, on the basis of available 
data, that the changes can be lawfully 
approved, the appellants will have the burden 
of proving by a preponderance of the evidence 
either that the available data is 
insufficient to give rise to 'reason to 
believe' or that available data in fact 
creates a reason to believe that the changes 
cannot be lawfully approved. 
Id. at 1081. While we did provide an articulation of the 
procedure to follow on remand in Crafts, we specifically 
acknowledged the limit of our holding in that case: "The 
respondents' arguments respecting the standards for approval of 
change applications, the burden of proof on the 'reason to 
believe' issue, and the authority of the State Engineer to make 
his approval conditional and interlocutory are all accurate. 
They are, however, irrelevant to the basis upon which we reverse 
. . . ." Id. at 1080, 
1|2 8 Regardless of their precedential status, our 
pronouncements in Boundary Springs and Crafts serve as the most 
detailed guidance we have supplied litigants regarding the 
appropriate standard of proof and proper allocation of burden in 
the change application context, and the district court was 
correct in turning to those cases in its attempt to discern the 
appropriate process. Unfortunately, our previous statements 
concerning the proper procedure to follow when considering the 
merits of a change application have been undeniably opaque, and 
reading our pronouncements on the issue in isolation can result 
in the imposition of an inappropriate standard of proof and an 
improper allocation of the burden of proof. However, when Crafts 
and Boundary Springs are read in concert with the Utah Code and 
our prior case law, the muddied water begins to clear and the 
appropriate approach becomes apparent. 
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1)29 The parties to the present appeal disagree on three 
fundamental points relating to the appropriateness of the course 
followed by the district court: (1) whether the proper standard 
of proof governing a determination that impairment will result 
from application approval is "preponderance of the evidence" or 
some other standard more favorable to a change applicant, (2) 
whether the burden of persuasion shifts to a protestant after an 
applicant makes a prima facie showing that application approval 
will not result in impairment of vested rights, and (3) whether 
an applicant's prima facie showing of no impairment can be 
sufficiently undermined by circumstantial evidence so as to make 
application approval inappropriate. We address each disagreement 
in turn and conclude that change applicants are required to show 
only reason to believe that impairment will not result from 
application approval, that the burden of persuasion remains on 
change applicants throughout the application process, and that 
circumstantial evidence may be sufficiently compelling to make 
application approval inappropriate. 
II. THE STANDARD OF PROOF 
^3 0 Both the State Engineer and Milburn argue that if a 
preponderance of the evidence establishes that vested rights will 
be impaired by the approval of a change application, the 
application must be rejected. On the other hand, the Searles 
contend that a change application can only be denied if direct, 
non-circumstantial evidence clearly demonstrates that impairment 
will actually result from the application's approval. Our case 
law establishes, however, that the proper standard, "reason to 
believe," lies somewhere between the two measures advanced by the 
parties. After first explaining our conclusion that a 
preponderance of the evidence standard is not appropriate in the 
change application context, we then discuss and give content to 
the appropriate, "reason to believe," standard. 
A. A Change Applicant Need Only Show Reason to Believe that No 
Impairment Will Result from Application Approval 
1]31 The Utah Code states that a change in water use "may 
not be made if it impairs any vested right without just 
compensation." Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-3(2) (b) (Supp. 2004) . 
However, at the application phase, our case law makes it clear 
that a change applicant is only required to show "reason to 
believe" that no impairment will result from application 
approval. See, e.g., Crafts v. Hansen, 667 P.2d 1068, 1082 (Utah 
1983) (Oaks, J., dissenting) (stating that "reason to believe" 
"is the practical equivalent of a probable cause determination in 
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a criminal case"); Piute Reservoir & Irr, Co. v. W. Pancruitch 
Irr. & Reservoir Co., 367 P.2d 855, 858 (Utah 1962) ("[T]he 
correct rule . . . is that the applicant must shown [sic] reason 
to believe that the proposed application for change can be made 
without impairing vested rights."); Am. Fork Irr. Co. v. Linke, 
239 P.2d 188, 191 (Utah 1951) ("We recognize plaintiffs' duty to 
prove that vested rights will not be impaired by approval of 
their application, but we also recognize that such duty must not 
be made unreasonably onerous . . . . " ) ; United States v. Dist. 
Court, 238 P.2d 1132, 1135 (Utah 1951) ("[The court] must 
determine from the evidence whether there is probable cause to 
believe . . . that such water can be diverted from the source of 
supply and used without injury to or conflict with prior 
rights."); Eardley v. Terry, 77 P.2d 362, 366 (Utah 1938) 
(xx[W]hen the application is filed, the state engineer is called 
upon to determine preliminarily whether there is probable cause 
to believe that an application can be perfected, having due 
regard to whether . . . it can be diverted and so used without 
injuring or conflicting with the prior rights of others."). Even 
our decision in Crafts, which the district court relied upon when 
determining the appropriate standard of proof, stated quite 
clearly that u[t]he determinative question before the trial court 
will be whether there is reason to believe, on the basis of 
current information, that existing water rights will not be 
impaired by the changes proposed in the applications." 667 P.2d 
at 1081 (emphasis added). 
1|32 In the present case, the State Engineer and Milburn 
argue that the reason to believe standard only applies at the 
preliminary stage of the application process and that application 
approval or denial ultimately rests on the preponderance of the 
evidence. However, that approach improperly combines the 
standard of proof applicable to the application process with the 
standard of proof applicable to a final adjudication of rights. 
1|33 In other words, the parties' confusion as to the 
appropriate burden to apply in the change application context 
stems from an imperfect understanding of the two roles played by 
the court system when water rights are at issue. In some 
situations courts are called upon to adjudicate rights, in other 
situations courts are called upon merely to review an 
administrative decision relating to those rights. The present 
case falls into the latter category. 
|^34 As a preliminary matter, it is well established that 
the state engineer has no authority to finally adjudicate water 
rights. As we stated in District Court, 238 P.2d at 1137, Mt]he 
Engineer in granting an application does not determine that the 
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applicant's rights are prior to the rights of the protestant but 
only finds that there is reason to believe that the application 
may be granted and some water beneficially used thereunder 
without interfering with the rights of others." See also Linke, 
23 9 P.2d at 190 ("[T]he Engineer's findings and decision have a 
sanctity extending no further than the authority delegated by law 
to his office.")/ Whitmore v. Murray City, 154 P.2d 748, 750 
(Utah 1944) ("The office of state engineer was not created to 
adjudicate vested rights between parties, but to administer and 
supervise the appropriation of the waters of the state."). In 
District Court, we stated that the state engineer's decision to 
approve or reject an application Mis administrative in nature and 
purpose and the decision of the court on review, except for the 
formalities of the trial and judgment is of the same nature and 
for the same purpose." 238 P. 2d at 1137. See also Crafts, 667 
P. 2d at 1070 (stating that when a district court reviews the 
state engineer's approval or denial of an application, u[t]he 
issues . . . [are] strictly limited to those which were, or could 
have been, raised before the State Engineer"); Dist. Court, 238 
P.2d at 1135 ("[The district court] should simply determine 
whether the application was rightly rejected. In determining 
that question, the court stands in the same position as the state 
engineer did. It must determine from the evidence whether there 
is probable cause to believe that . . . [water can be] used 
without injury to or conflict with prior rights."). 
1)35 Accordingly, the conclusion is inescapable that a 
district court, when reviewing the state engineer's decision to 
approve or reject an application, is not sitting in its capacity 
as an adjudicator of rights, but is merely charged with ensuring 
that the state engineer correctly performed an administrative 
task. We stated as much in Eardley, when we acknowledged that, 
when conducting a de novo review of the state engineer's approval 
or rejection of an application, the court simply "determines 
whether the application should be approved or rejected and does 
not fix the rights of the parties beyond the determination of 
that matter." 77 P.2d at 365. As will be discussed in more 
detail below, it follows that a change applicant should be 
subjected to a less onerous standard of proof at the application 
phase than that used during a final adjudication of rights. 
1J36 Although at first blush it appears that this procedure 
unjustly favors new appropriations and new uses to the detriment 
of vested rights, the procedure actually provides a balance 
between the two policy goals of putting water to the most 
beneficial use possible while simultaneously guarding vested 
rights. The procedure accomplishes this by placing a fairly low 
burden on a party seeking approval of a change application, 
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thereby allowing the party to attempt to perfect the right to use 
the water in the manner contemplated by the application. If such 
use can be accomplished without interfering with vested rights, 
the policy of putting water to the best use possible is furthered 
without causing injury to anyone. See Linke, 239 P.2d at 191 
("[W]e cannot turn a deaf ear to every request which reasonably 
appears designed for a more beneficial use of water not impairing 
vested rights by saying, as the Engineer in his decision did, 
that the proposed change xcould interfere substantially with the 
vested rights of others.'")/ Dist. Court, 238 P.2d at 1137 
(MT]he law provides a period of experimentation during which 
ways and means may be sought to make beneficial use of more water 
under the application before the rights of the parties are 
finally adjudicated."). 
1)3 7 In other words, during the application process, the 
court system serves to ensure that applicants who successfully 
establish reason to believe that a proposed water use can be 
accomplished without impairment of vested rights are given the 
opportunity to prove it. Determining whether an applicant has, 
in fact, proven that the new manner of use does not impair vested 
rights is a matter ultimately left to a final judicial 
determination of rights. We note, however, that the courts are 
fully empowered to protect vested rights from impairment 
throughout the perfection process. It is for this reason that we 
have previously stated that, after a change application has been 
approved, an applicant can only proceed absent *injury to [prior] 
rights if he hopes to perfect a right and be immune from 
liability. Legally, no one can be hurt by the procedure 
established by the Legislature. At the same time, however, it 
permits the development of our water resources to the utmost." 
Eardley, 77 P.2d at 376-77. 
i|3 8 By establishing this system, the legislature gave 
practical effect to its determination that the possible benefits 
to be derived from a liberal policy toward application approval 
outweigh the potential of possible temporary harm if a use 
proposed in an application results in an impairment of vested 
rights. The value of allowing experimentation cannot be 
understated. As we stated in District Court. 238 P.2d at 1137, 
[ijf we were to finally adjudicate 
applicant's right to change or to appropriate 
water at the time that such application was 
rejected or approved, he would get only such 
rights as he could establish by a 
preponderance of the evidence that he could 
use beneficially without interfering with the 
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rights of others and in such hearing he would 
not have the benefit of any opportunity to 
experiment and demonstrate what he could do. 
Such a system would cut off the possibility 
of establishing many valuable rights without 
a chance to demonstrate what could be done. 
Our pronouncement in District Court nicely illustrates the danger 
of moving the preponderance burden, applicable when making a 
final determination of rights, to the preliminary application 
phase. 
H3 9 Pursuing a policy that allows experimentation with 
water use is not antithetical to a strong and legitimate desire 
to protect the vested rights of other water users. The 
procedures in place do not allow experimentation simply for the 
sake of experimentation, and they certainly do not allow the 
vested rights of other water users to be impaired by new use. 
See Piute Reservoir, 367 P.2d at 856 ("[W]hile we approved the 
application, we definitely held that the change should not be 
allowed to operate without affirmative proof that the rights of 
lower water users . . . were not thereby impaired."); Eardlev, 77 
P. 2d at 376 ("Filing the application does not give the applicant; 
the right or license to proceed to the injury of prior rights. 
He can proceed only upon an absence of injury to such rights if 
he hopes to perfect a right and be immune from liability.") . 
Given that application approval is only a preliminary step in the 
perfection process and that the courts will remain open to water 
users whose rights face impairment, the possibility of a water 
user with vested rights suffering an irreparable injury due to 
the approval of a change application is limited. 
1J4 0 Further, we note that before a change applicant's 
proposed use can be finally perfected and a certificate 
recognizing the validity of the change issued, the applicant is 
obligated to supply affirmative proof that no harm is being 
caused to the possessors of prior rights by the applicant's use. 
See, e.g., Eardlev, 77 P.2d at 365-66 ("In his final proof [for a 
certificate of appropriation], the applicant is required to show 
the nature and extent of the works he has constructed, the 
quantity of water appropriated, and the application thereof to a 
beneficial use. Whether the water so appropriated is subject to 
being appropriated and can be taken for the use contemplated 
without injury to the owners of prior rights is necessarily 
involved in making final proof and must of necessity be 
determined by the state engineer from the proof submitted."). 
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141- Thus, after a change applicant has completed any 
necessary improvements and has commenced diverting water and 
putting that water to beneficial use, the applicant must 
eventually prove to the state engineer that the use in question 
in no way impairs prior rights. In making such proof, the change 
applicant carries the burden and must convince the state engineer 
by a preponderance of the evidence that other water users are not 
harmed by the change. See Piute Reservoir & Irr. Co. v. W. 
Panguitch Irr. & Reservoir Co., 364 P.2d 113, 116 (Utah 1961) 
(xx[I]n proving its claim under this application to the State 
Engineer to obtain a certificate of such change or to a court 
where the rights established under such application may be 
litigated, applicant must show more than that there is reason to 
believe that the change does not impair established vested rights 
of the protestants. It must support a decision in its favor on 
this question by substantial evidence, and it has the burden of 
convincing the trier of the facts by a preponderance of all of 
the evidence that such change does not impair the vested rights 
of the protesting lower water users." (footnote omitted)), reh'g 
granted, Piute Reservoir, 367 P.2d 855. 
1(42 We recognize that a change applicant assumes a 
substantial risk by investing time and money in an effort to 
perfect a proposed change in use that may later be disallowed by 
the state engineer or a court. This risk allocation is, however, 
in accord with the balance struck between the competing policies 
of encouraging experimentation with water use on one hand and of 
guarding the vested rights of this state's water users on the 
other. It is the change applicant who seeks to reap the benefit 
of the change in water use, and it is the applicant who must bear 
the risk that the proposed use, once initiated, may run afoul of 
prior rights. In this way, the law properly forces the change 
applicant to assess risks and rewards, and to demonstrate 
confidence in the propriety of a proposed use by financing its 
commencement. 
1)43 We also recognize that the experimentation period is 
most effective when the effects of any change in use can be 
easily observed, and calculated. When a change applicant is 
confronted with a situation in which the experimentation period 
is unlikely to provide evidence beyond that known at the time a 
change application is initially filed, it may be wise for that 
applicant to seek a declaratory judgment under the more demanding 
preponderance of the evidence standard before expending resources 
to effectuate the proposed use. Cf. Whitmore, 154 P.2d at 751 
(allowing a change applicant to pursue a declaratory action as to 
the priority of certain rights even though the applicant's 
proposed change had yet to be perfected) . 
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f44 Having concluded that the reason to believe standard 
governs the change application process and that a preponderance 
standard is reserved for a final adjudication of rights, it is 
apparent that we must remand to enable the district court to 
consider the evidence with the proper standard in mind. To aid 
the district court in this process, we now provide content to the 
reason to believe standard and will then address the parties' 
arguments relative to the appropriate allocation of the burden of 
proof before turning to our final inquiry: whether a protestant 
can block application approval through the use of circumstantial 
evidence that establishes a probability that impairment will 
result if the change application is approved. 
B. The Reason to Believe Standard 
^45 Although our case law has clearly established that a 
change applicant is required to show reason to believe that 
application approval will not result in impairment of vested 
rights, the content of that standard remains less than clear. 
The Searles argue on appeal that a protestant seeking to defeat 
application approval can only succeed by producing direct 
evidence of actual impairment. In the Searles' view, evidence of 
"likely" impairment--regardless of how likely that impairment is-
-will always be insufficient to defeat application approval. 
H46 In his dissent in Crafts, Justice Oaks endorsed a view 
similar to that advanced by the Searles, opining that "[a] change 
application should only be denied when, after resolving all 
contradictions in favor of the proponent of change, the evidence 
offered is so deficient that it provides no reason to believe 
that the proposed change could be made without impairing rights." 
667 P.2d at 1083 (Oaks, J., dissenting). Although we concur, as 
did the Crafts majority, with Justice Oaks's understanding that 
the preliminary nature of the application process counsels in 
favor of placing a burden on applicants that is not unduly 
onerous, we disagree with Justice Oaks's conception of that 
standard. 
*(|47 Adopting such a low quantum of proof would turn the 
state engineer into nothing more than a rubber stamp, approving 
every change application submitted. As mentioned above, the 
procedures put in place by the legislature do not allow 
experimentation simply for the sake of experimentation. To 
adequately serve its purpose, the application process must 
provide some meaningful barrier so that the floodgates remain 
closed to all applications except those with a sufficient 
probability of successful perfection. 
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^4 8 With that concern in mind, we conclude that the reason 
to believe standard is best understood as falling between the 
preponderance standard applicable in final adjudications and 
Justice Oaks's conception of the reason to believe standard as 
the lowest of hurdles. Specifically, we reassert the validity of 
our prior, admittedly opaque pronouncements, and now clarify that 
a change applicant's burden is satisfied if there is sufficient 
evidence to support a reasonable belief that the changes outlined 
in the application can be perfected without impairing vested 
rights. In other words, to gain application approval, a change 
applicant must convince the decisionmaker that there is reason to 
believe that the use proposed in the application can be 
undertaken without impairing vested rights. However, before 
application approval is warranted, it must be clear that the 
decisionmaker's determination that there is reason to believe is 
grounded in evidence sufficient to make that belief reasonable. 
Cf. State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, 1 16, 20 P.3d 300 (establishing a 
"reasonable belief" standard for use in criminal probable cause 
determinations and providing that at "the preliminary hearing 
stages, the prosecution must present sufficient evidence to 
support a reasonable belief that an offense has been committed 
and that the defendant committed it"). Just as the probable 
cause standard applicable to preliminary hearings in criminal 
cases serves the primary purpose of "ferreting out . . . 
groundless and improvident prosecutions," State v. Anderson, 612 
P.2d 778, 783 (Utah 1980), so does the reason to believe standard 
serve to stem the flow of proposed changes in water use by 
arresting any proposal not supported by a reasonable belief that 
the change can be accomplished without impairing vested rights. 
%A9 This standard is both workable and consistent with our 
prior cases that have analogized the reason to believe standard 
to the probable cause standard applicable during the preliminary 
phase of a criminal trial. See, e.g., Crafts, 667 P.2d at 1082 
(Oaks, J., dissenting) (stating that the reason to believe 
standard "is the practical equivalent of a probable cause 
determination in a criminal case"); Dist. Court, 238 P.2d at 1135 
("[The court] must determine from the evidence whether there is 
probable cause to believe . . . that such water can be diverted 
. . without injury to or conflict with prior rights."). 
1|50 Having articulated the proper conception of the reason 
to believe standard, we now address the appropriate allocation of 
the burden of proof before addressing the Searles' contention 
that a reason to believe showing can only be undermined by direct 
evidence of actual impairment. 
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III. THE BURDEN OF PROOF 
1|51 Both the Searles and Milburn argue that after a change 
applicant makes a prima facie showing that no impairment will 
result from application approval, the burden of persuasion to 
show impairment shifts to the party protesting the application. 
The State Engineer argues that the burden of persuasion should 
remain on the change applicant at all times during the 
application process. We agree with the State Engineer that there 
is no shift in the burden of persuasion.3 
]^52 As an initial matter, we note that there are sound 
policy reasons for placing the burden of persuasion squarely on 
the change applicant. As we acknowledged in Tanner v. Humphreys, 
Mi] f the change is made, it disturbs the 
existing order . . . and causes a 
modification to be made in the general 
adjudication decree. It is fitting that a 
party who asks such relief should bear the 
burden of proving that the vested rights of 
others will not thereby be infringed if it is 
granted. It is only the burden which is 
usually imposed upon the moving party in a 
lawsuit." 
48 P.2d 484, 488 (Utah 1935) (quoting New Cache La Poudre Irr. 
Co. v. Water Supply & Storage Co., Ill P. 610, 611 (Colo. 1910) 
and citing Monte Vista Canal Co. v. Centennial Irr. Ditch Co., 
135 P. 981 (Colo. Ct. App. 1913)). 
3
 The terminology covering evidentiary burdens is highly 
confusing, as various courts and commentators have used prevalent 
terms in different ways. Generally speaking, there are two 
evidentiary burdens: a burden of persuasion and a burden of 
production. See Koesling v. Basamakis, 539 P.2d 1043, 1046 (Utah 
1975). "Burden of persuasion" refers to Ma] party's duty to 
convince the fact-finder to view the facts in a way that favors 
that party." Black's Law Dictionary 190 (7th ed. 1999). "Burden 
of production" refers to "[a] party's duty to introduce enough 
evidence on an issue to have the issue decided by the fact-
finder, rather than decided against the party in a peremptory 
ruling." Id. Finally, "burden of proof" is a catch-all term 
that encompasses both the burden of persuasion and the burden of 
production and generally refers to Ma] party's duty to prove a 
disputed assertion or charge." Id. In the present case, the 
parties assign error only to the district court's allocation of 
the burden of persuasion. 
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H53 We recognize that language from our previous cases can 
be read as contemplating some sort of formal shift in the burden 
of persuasion. However, that language is better understood as an 
acknowledgment of the reality that once an applicant has produced 
sufficient evidence to persuade the decisionmaker that there is 
reason to believe that no vested rights will be impaired by 
application approval, a protestant will fail if evidence is not 
introduced that undermines the applicant's proof. Perhaps the 
present confusion has been caused by our use of the phrase "prima 
facie showing" to describe the amount of evidence that a change 
applicant must put forward when seeking application approval. 
See Edward L. Kimball & Ronald N. Boyce, Utah Evidence Law 3-8 
(1996) (uvPrima facie evidence' is an ambiguous phrase."). 
Generally speaking, a prima facie showing is made by successfully 
producing enough evidence to survive a motion to dismiss and to 
send the matter to the jury. See Johnson v. Bell, 666 P.2d 308, 
311 (Utah 1983). However, we have noted that the general concept 
of a "prima facie showing" operates differently when there is no 
jury. See id. In Johnson, we explained that u[t]o apply the 
jury trial practice [applicable to prima facie showings] in non-
jury proceedings would be to erect a requirement compelling a 
defendant to put on his case . . . if the plaintiff had, 
according to jury trial concepts, made "a case for the jury,'" 
even if the judge had already concluded that the plaintiff ought 
not to prevail. Id. (internal quotation omitted). 
1|54 In keeping with this distinction, we have, in the 
context of the change application process, used the phrase "prima 
facie showing" to denote the amount of evidence that would be 
sufficient to warrant application approval absent the 
presentation of additional evidence undermining confidence in an 
applicant's proof that no impairment of vested rights will result 
from the use proposed in the application. Cf. Godeskv v. Provo 
City Corp.. 690 P.2d 541, 547 (Utah 1984) ("Prima facie evidence 
means only that quantum of evidence that suffices for proof of a 
particular fact until the fact is contradicted by other 
evidence," (internal quotation omitted)). 
155 In the final calculation, a change applicant will be 
entitled to application approval only if the decisionmaker is 
persuaded that there is no reason to believe that vested rights 
will be impaired if the application is approved. To successfully 
persuade the decisionmaker, an applicant must produce evidence 
sufficient to support a reasonable belief that no impairment will 
result from application approval. As a result, there may be 
situations in which even an unopposed change application is not 
approved because the applicant has failed to adequately persuade 
the decisionmaker that there is reason to believe that no harm 
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will result from approval. However, any party protesting a 
change application is certainly entitled to present evidence in 
an effort to convince the decisionmaker that application approval 
is not warranted under the circumstances. 
!^56 Having clarified that the burden of persuasion remains 
on the change applicant throughout the application process, we 
next address the Searles' contention that a reason to believe 
showing can only be undermined by direct evidence of actual 
impairment. 
IV. A CHANGE APPLICATION CAN BE DEFEATED THROUGH THE USE OF 
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE 
115V While producing evidence sufficient to block approval 
of a change application is no doubt a difficult task for a 
protestant, illustrating impairment by means not reliant on 
conjecture or probability would, in many cases, be an impossible 
task. Determinations of whether impairment would result from 
. -lication approval often hinge on probabilities. As \ /e pointed 
UUL
- in Crafts v. Hansen, 
[t]he future impact of changes in allocation 
and use of water resources in a large 
geographical area is not generally 
susceptible of direct observation, 
measurement and calculation. Great reliance 
must be placed upon expert judgment based on 
professional knowledge and training, 
familiarity with the geography, and as much 
accurate data as can be acquired in the 
process of making future projections 
[W]e are not dealing so much with 
"facts" . , . as with the opinion of experts 
about the accuracy and legitimacy of the 
projections based upon the available facts. 
667 P.2d 1068, 1081 (Utah 1983). Consequently, we cannot say 
that circumstantial evidence showing a possibility of impairment 
is, in all cases, insufficient to justify denying an application. 
^58 If the evidence produced by a protestant is ccnipei^:.-; 
enough to undermine the reasonableness of the assertion that the 
proposed change will not impair vested rights, the state engineer 
should reject the application seeking to effect that change. We 
can envision situations in which circumstantial evidence could 
undermine an applicant's evidence to such an extent that it would 
be unreasonable to believe that the proposed change can be 
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accomplished without impairing vested rights. Consequently, we 
decline to exclude circumstantial evidence from being weighed 
when a decision as to application approval must be made. 
CONCLUSION 
^59 We conclude that the district court invoked the wrong 
standard of proof and improperly allocated the burden of proof :i n 
undertaking its review of the State Engineer's denial of the 
Searles' change application, A change applicant is required only 
to show reason to believe that the proposed use can be undertaken 
without impairing vested rights in order for the application to 
warrant approval. The burden of persuasion remains o^n the 
applicant throughout the application process, although the 
protestant has the opportunity to provide evidence undermining 
the applicant's reason to; believe showing. In producing such 
evidence, a protestant may rely exclusively on circumstantial 
evidence. Whether such evidence is sufficient to compel the 
denial of an application will depend on the unique facts of each 
case. Accordingly, we remand this case to the district court for 
reconsideration under the standard outlined in this opinion. 
)^6 0 Chief Justice Durham, Associate Chief Justice Wilkins, 
Justice Parrish, and Justice Nehring concur in Justice Durrant's 
opinion. 
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